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I. Introduction
In 1994, The Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to the game theorist John Nash,
who, in the early 1950s, formulated elegant mathematical models for the strategic interaction
among small numbers of decision-makers in situations involving elements of both conflict and
cooperation.  The “Nash equilibrium” remains the most widely used equilibrium concept in game
theory.  Soon after his pioneering work was published, it was discovered that Nash suffered from
schizophrenia.  In the last thirty-five years, Nash has done little productive work, living in the care
of hospitals, family, and friends.  Many doubted that Sweden’s Royal Society would award the
Nobel Prize to a person with severe mental illness.  When they did, Ariel Rubenstein, himself a
prominent game theorist, expressed in a New York Times interview his admiration for Nash’s
work and his pleasure that the Royal Society acknowledged by their decision that there was
nothing disqualifying about mental illness.  Schizophrenia was, in Rubenstein’s words, “just like
cancer.”
Public attitudes about mental illness have changed since the 1950s when Nash became ill,
and the mentally ill have in many ways been integrated into the mainstream of the health care
system.  The fact remains, however, that in terms of public and private policy in the U.S., mental
illness and substance abuse are not treated the same as other illnesses.  In comparison to physical
illness, governments pay for more of mental health and substance abuse (MH/SA) care, and
private insurance pays for less.  Treatment for mental and addictive disorders is often involuntary.
This is rare for physical illness.  The public mental health care system has had quality problems
that are regarded as scandalous.  The public system in mental health has a role as protector of
public safety.  When efforts have been made to reform the health care sector in the U.S., mental
health and substance abuse care are usually handled separately.  President Clinton’s proposed2
health care reform in 1993, to take the most recent example, did not include long-term treatment
for mental illness in the required services to be offered in health plans.
This chapter is concerned with the economics of mental illness and mental health care.
Following convention, we will use the term “mental illness” to include substance abuse disorders
such as drug or alcohol abuse and dependence.  Mental health has been an active and distinct
subfield of health economics for some time.  Though mental health economics can claim no
special methodology, it has its own conferences, training programs, and journals.
1  Mental health
economics is like health economics only more so: uncertainty and variation in treatments are
greater; the assumption of patient self-interested behavior is more dubious; response to financial
incentives such as insurance is exacerbated; the social consequences and external costs of illness
are more formidable.  We will elaborate on these statements and consider their implications
throughout this chapter.  “Special characteristics” of mental illness, and the persons with mental
illness, will be identified and related to the observance of institutions paying for and providing
mental health care.  When Pauly (1988) asked, “Is Health Care Different?”, he was contrasting
health care with the rest of the economy.  Here we explore the question: “Is mental health care
different from health care?”
The first reaction for many people is to answer “yes” to this question, and give the reason
as stigma.  Literally, a “mark” or a “stain,” stigma sets persons with mental illness apart as
undesirable.  Nunnally (1961) found that regardless of the respondent's education, the mentally ill
were regarded as dangerous, unpredictable, and socially of little value.  In one of the few studies
comparing attitudes over time, Matas et al. (1986) analyzed treatment of mental illness in the
                                                       
1 Much of this is due to support from the National Institute of Mental Health in various forms.  The late Carl Taube
was the official of the NIMH who was most responsible for promoting the field of economics of mental health.3
press, concluding that in spite of some “minor, cosmetic changes,” overall, “content and attitudes
had changed little.”
2  One hopes that national educational campaigns such as the NIMH’s
Depression Awareness initiative have had some effect, but the degree is hard to judge.  It seems
safe to say that some part of the public's fear of the mentally ill remains irrational and misplaced.
3
The historical importance of stigma calls attention to the salient point, important to the rational as
well as the irrational side of the story, that differential treatment of mental health care for
purposes of policy will be driven not just by differences in the disease and its treatment (e.g.,
demand is more responsive), but differences in the people who have the disease (e.g., they are
more costly in other ways).  This chapter, using methods of economics, will be concerned with the
more “rational” reasons why mental illness is treated differently than other illnesses, without
claiming that this is the full picture.
The core issues in mental health and health economics include:
• Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: These are traditional concerns in health economics.
We will argue that these features of insurance markets apply with particular force for
mental health care.
 
• Non-contractable provider actions.  The term “noncontractable” was not in use when
Arrow wrote his overview of health economics, but he clearly had this in mind when he
discussed the ways health markets adapt to ensure that physicians put sufficient effort into
caring for patients.  Maintaining effort in a managed care environment is a problem for all
areas of care.  We will argue that it may be especially problematic in mental health due to
the severity of selection-related incentives.  At the same time it appears that special




• Externalities:  Mental disorders are often chronic conditions that create substantial
disability and strike people early in life (ages 15 to 30).  These illnesses are correlated with
                                                       
2 Prejudice against the mentally ill on the part of the nominating committee for fellowship in the prestigious
Econometric Society thwarted Nash’s induction in 1988, according to Nasar (1998).  Two years later the
nominating committee was bypassed and Nash was elected directly by the members in an overwhelming vote.
3 Link and Cullen (1986) demonstrate that the more people have direct contact with persons with mental illness,
the less dangerous they are regarded, supporting this conclusion.4
other costly social problems: unemployment, crime, violence, and homelessness.  Many of
these problems have consequences for others as well as the person with the illness.  For
this reason government has historically taken a large role in provision and regulation of
some forms of mental health care.
The mental health sector contains institutions, professions, and illnesses that are unfamiliar
to policy analysts and even to specialists in health economics.  As such, policy has often been
applied to the institutions of the mental health sector as an afterthought to a broad health policy
decision.  We hope to introduce some of the special institutional features in MH/SA to a health
economics audience and to review some of the empirical research that has been focused on mental
health issues.  In addition, we will review some of the policy trade-offs facing those interested in
remedying market failures in the mental health sub-sector.
This chapter is organized into six main sections.  Following this introduction is a
description of the institutional context within which mental health and substance abuse care is
provided.  This includes a discussion of mental and addictive illnesses, their consequences, and the
organizations involved in financing and delivery of care.  The third section focuses on issues of
moral hazard and rationing of care.  Evidence on the impact of benefit design and payment
policies is assessed.  A general framework for analyzing rationing of treatment within managed
care is presented, which allows us to evaluate the case for “parity” for mental health in health care
payment systems within a managed care environment.  Adverse selection is addressed in the
fourth section.  The rationing model developed in the previous section is applied to selection-
related behavior by managed health care plans.  The reasons why mental health might be more
vulnerable to selection-driven market features are set out.  Risk adjustment and behavioral health
carve-outs are examined as institutions aimed at countering selection-related incentives.  The fifth5
section focuses on externalities and the role of state government in the delivery of mental health
and substance abuse care.  We offer some concluding observations in the sixth and final section.
II.  The Institutional Context
The nature of mental illness, the persons with mental illness, use of treatment services, and
the supply side of the market differ from the general health sector.
A. Mental Illness and Persons with Mental Illness
World-wide, mental illness is among the most prevalent and disabling illnesses. In the
U.S., approximately 29.5% of the population is estimated to experience some diagnosable mental
or addictive disorder in a 12-month period (Kessler et al., 1993).  Some diseases have been found
to be roughly similar in high and middle income countries when the same epidemiologic
assessments are applied (Weissman et al., 1995).  However, comparative epidemiological studies
show considerable variation in illness patterns across nations.  For example, rates of depression
are estimated to be considerably lower in Puerto Rico than in the U.S. or Switzerland.  Substance
abuse is much higher (roughly 4 times higher) in the U.S. and Puerto Rico than in Switzerland
(Swendsen et al., 1997).
The most severe mental disorders, schizophrenia, manic depression, and some forms of
major depression affect about 4% of the population each year and are very disabling.  Within this
group are the psychoses, illnesses associated with severe disturbances in cognitive functions.
These disorders are persistent illnesses that tend to have initial onsets relatively early in life (ages
15 to 30).  Individuals with these serious illnesses most often suffer for relatively long periods
(APA, 1995).  Severe forms of mental illness reduce an individual’s ability to function in the
consumer role, and interfere with the maintenance and creation of social networks (family and6
friends) weakening the connection with others who might serve as caregivers or proxy decision-
makers (Segal, Silverman, and Baumohl, 1989).
Effective treatments, primarily drug therapy, reduce symptoms and improve functioning
for all of these illnesses.  Existing treatments contend with but do not “cure” mental illness, and
persons with these illnesses require long-term monitoring and treatment as well as periods of
intensive services such as hospitalization.  Many require extended periods of assistance with
housing and social support, contributing to the need for a public risk in caring for this most
severely ill group.
Mental and addictive disorders are costly to society both in terms of direct spending on
treatment as well as in terms of the losses sustained as a consequence of the disorders.  Spending
on mental health and substance abuse care (MH/SA) in 1995 was estimated to be about $75
billion (Triplett, 1998), amounting to about 8.3% of personal health expenditures.  Overall
spending on MH/SA in the U.S. (including specialty and general care) grew at 13% per annum
during the 1963-1972 period, at 14% per year during 1972-1980, and 9.3% in the 1980-1995
time span.  Total health care spending grew at yearly rates of 11.5%, 13.7%, and 9.9% for the
three time intervals respectively.  This suggests that mental health spending tracked overall
spending quite closely over the 1963-1995 period (Triplett, 1998).
While the United States spends more on MH/SA in absolute terms than do other western
nations, it spends a lower proportion of personal health outlays than Great Britain (16.6%),
Canada (11.4%), and Australia (8.4%) (Triplett, 1998).  Mental disorders impose costs on the
individual, his or her family, and on society as a whole.  In aggregate, Rice et al. (1990) found
indirect costs to be twice the direct costs of care.  Studies of individual behavior have documented
the impact of mental health on employment, productivity and earnings (Berndt et al., 1997; Ettner7
et al., 1997; Bartel and Taubman, 1986; Mullahy and Sindelar, 1993), criminal activity (Steadman
et al., 1998; Link, 1992), motor vehicle accidents (Rice et al., 1990), child abuse and neglect
(Kelleher et al., 1994), homelessness (Jencks, 1994), and divorce (Bartel and Taubman, 1986).
The indirect cost of mental illness has also been studied in terms of employment and
earnings.  A common finding in psychiatric epidemiology is an inverse correlation between income
and rates of illness in a population (Bruce, Takeuchi, and Leaf, 1991).  However, the causal
connection between mental illness and income and other labor market outcomes is complex.
Economic stress, such as involuntary unemployment, may aggravate illness.  Some difficult-to-
measure personal characteristics which make a positive contribution to earnings are correlated
with some illnesses.  Creativity, energy, and attention to detail may each be more common among
persons who have mania or obsessive-compulsive disorders.  Furthermore, persons who have
diseases and are successful enough to remain in the labor force may have atypical values of some
other unmeasured labor market characteristics.  Estimates of the impact of mental disorders on
labor market outcomes have used longitudinal data, or instrumental variables and cross-sectional
data to find substantial reductions in earnings and other measures of productivity associated with
illness.  Bartel and Taubman (1986), and Frank and Gertler (1991) use longitudinal data with
information on prior illness to estimate reductions in earnings of men of between 20% and 25%
for conditions that are thought to produce the most impairment such as psychotic disorders and
major depression.  Neuroses and other mental disorders had smaller but significant negative
impacts on earnings (5% to 15%).  Ettner, Frank and Kessler (1997) used cross sectional data
from a national epidemiological survey of the U.S. population to examine the effect of mental and
addictive illnesses on employment and earnings.  Information on the family history of mental
illness and the timing of the onset of symptoms of mental illness enabled the authors to use8
instrumental variable techniques to estimate the impact of mental illness on income taking account
of possible endogeneity of mental illness.  They found that the presence of a diagnosable mental
illness reduced employment by about 11% for both males and females and for those who worked,
the estimated loss of income attributable to mental illnesses was about 20% for women and 10%
for men.
The connection between mental disorders and violence and crime has been controversial,
since it is tied so closely to the sensitive issue of social stigma.  Recent research has found clear
evidence that mental illness and substance abuse are associated with higher rates of criminal
activity.  A study by Link and colleagues (1992) illustrates the tenor of a larger set of research
findings.  When psychiatric patients are compared to a control population, matched according to
the neighborhood in which they live and socioeconomic characteristics, psychiatric patients exhibit
significantly higher rates of weapon use and violent behavior.  Torrey (1994), an advocate for the
seriously mentally ill, arrived at a similar conclusion based on a review of the literature, stating:
“Although the vast majority of individuals with serious mental illness are not more dangerous than
members of the general population, recent findings suggest the existence of a sub-group that is
more dangerous” (p.653).  According to Steadman et al. (1998), the subgroup includes those
individuals with a co-occurring substance abuse disorder.  Individuals who suffer from both
mental illness and substance abuse problems are more likely to be involved in violence than
otherwise similar people with mental illness only or without mental illness.  (It is notable that
individuals with a mental disorder are significantly more likely to abuse substances than are people
without such illnesses.)
Addictive disorders have also been tied to auto accidents (see Rice et al., 1990 for a
review), unsafe sexual practices and child abuse and neglect (Kelleher et al., 1994).  Alcohol and9
drug abuse in mothers has also been linked to poor birth outcomes (Secretary of DHHS, 1993;
ASPE, 1994).  Even at levels of use that do not qualify as “abuse”, alcohol and drug use can be
problematic, especially among the young.  Lowry et al. (1994) report that high school students
were more likely to engage in risky sexual behavior if they used alcohol (relative odds of 2.7),
marijuana (odds of 9.2) or cocaine (odds of 26.8) relative to non-users.
Finally, homelessness has often been linked to mental illness and substance abuse in both
recent literature (Jencks, 1994) and the popular press.  Many mental hospital patients were shifted
to nursing homes, jails, and streets as a result of the reduction in public mental hospital capacity
during the 1960s and 1970s (O’Flaherty, 1996).  Jencks contends that the “deinstitutionalization”
movement was a prime cause of the growth of homelessness during the 1980’s, while other
observers (e.g. O’Flaherty, 1996) have questioned the strength of the causal connection.
This brief profile of mental and addictive disorders and their social consequences leads to
two conclusions useful for an economic analysis of mental health and mental health care.  First,
mental and addictive disorders are prevalent and associated with a variety of social costs not
incurred by the affected individuals.  The existence of externalities means that decentralized
market decision-making will tend to undervalue effective treatments for mental and addictive
illnesses.  Second, the social costs of mental and addictive disorders are concentrated in the 4% of
the population that experience the more severe forms of the disorders.  This sub-group of people
displays a series of characteristics that make them “undesirable” to insurers as clients, employers
as workers and to significant segments of the general population as neighbors.  Thus, in the
absence of some compensatory factor, there are selection-related private benefits linked to
avoiding employing and insuring those at risk for mental illness.
B.  Who is Treated for Mental Illness10
One of the dilemmas in formulating policy towards mental health care is that
“undertreatment” and “overtreatment” can coexist within the same payment system.  Of the 30%
of the population that has a mental illness at some point during a year, only 17.3% get some
treatment in the health care sector with an additional 7.4% getting their only treatment from a
human service agency or a self-help group (e.g. Alcoholics Anonymous).
4  Thus, only about 25%
of those with a diagnosable condition get some form of treatment over a twelve-month period.
Low rates of treatment conditional on having a disorder also characterize the more severely ill.
Only 36% of those with manic depression or major depression in a year are treated in any sector,
and only 25% of those with substance abuse are treated.  (Approximately 57% of individuals with
schizophrenia do get some health care treatment.)
At the same time, 4.5% of individuals with no disorder (assessed with a diagnostic
instrument) receive mental health care from a health care provider and 8.2% get treatment from
some human service organization or self-help group.  Those individuals with no diagnosed
condition that obtain treatment make almost the same number of visits as those with at least one
diagnosed condition: 7.9 visits per year compared to 9.3 visits (Kessler et al., 1997).  Putting this
together with the figures in the earlier paragraph, we can say that nearly 38% of all users and 28%
of all visits for mental health care are not associated with a diagnosable disorder.
5  Moreover, a
large segment of that group report that they are in either good or excellent emotional health (see
                                                       
4 All the data cited in this paragraph are based on information from the National Comorbidity Survey.  Detailed
discussion of these findings is in from Kessler et al. (1997).
5 The share of the total population that are both users of care and have a diagnosable condition is 0.05 (0.17 x
0.30).  The share of the total population that use services but do not have a diagnosable condition is 0.03 (0.045
x 0.70).  Thus 38% of the users do not have a diagnosable condition.11
Kessler et al., 1997).
 6  It is interesting to note that in Canada the portion of users of MH/SA care
who have no disorders is considerably smaller than in the U.S. (Kessler et al., 1997).
Spending on treatment is concentrated on those people with the most disabling conditions.
It was estimated that in 1990 nearly 30% of spending on mental health and substance abuse care
was accounted for by 5% of the users of care (Frank et al., 1994).  For example, the mean level of
spending on treatment of mental health and substance abuse care in a large insured population for
1993 was $8 per enrollee per month, while the mean cost of treating someone with a diagnosis of
manic depression was about $6,700.
People with a history of mental health care use also tend to incur higher levels of general
health expenditures than do others.  For example, data from Michigan Medicaid indicate that the
average person had expenditures of $1,873 per year in health care over a three-year period (1991-
1993) compared to $3,722 (including mental health care) for individuals with any treatment for
mental illness during that time period.  Roughly 66% of the difference is accounted for by mental
health costs.  Cuffel and Goldman (1998) report that mental health care users spend nearly 90%
more on general medical care than did non-users.
A large segment of individuals who receive the highest intensity of care do so, in part,
because they are compelled to by the legal system.  For example, in 1994, approximately 43% of
days of care provided in specialty psychiatric hospitals and specialty psychiatric units of general
hospitals were accounted for by individuals involuntarily admitted.  In addition, 27% of days of
                                                       
6 Results from an epidemiological survey in Ontario suggest that people with the most disabling illnesses are
somewhat more likely to get treatment in Ontario (Kessler et al., 1997b).  The U.S. may perform relatively badly
on this score.12
care in residential facilities and 8% of patients in ambulatory settings were involuntarily placed in
care.
7
C.  Who Pays for Mental Health Care
Spending on mental health and substance abuse care displays a different pattern than that
found in the health sector overall.  Table 1 reports the composition of spending on health and
MH/SA care in the U.S.  Among the most important differences reported in the Table is the role
of government as a direct funder of care.  The other federal (block grants) and other state and
local categories comprise 23.3% of all MH/SA spending compared to 11.5% of overall healthcare
spending.  In addition, Medicaid plays a somewhat larger role in MH/SA spending, 18.8% vs.
14.8%.  Finally Medicare plays a considerably smaller part in funding MH/SA than it does for all
health services.  Thus state and local government generally allocated more resources for MH/SA,
42.1% (summing block grant, state/local and Medicaid) than for health services generally, 26.3%.
This highlights the differing division of labor between federal and state government.  Whereas the
federal government funds over 25% of health spending, it accounts for less than 20% of MH/SA
expenditures.
Table 1 shows that private health insurance accounts for a smaller share of spending in
MH/SA than in all health care (25.8% vs. 31%).  The table also suggests that private out-of-
pocket spending makes up a smaller share of non-public funding in MH/SA than in overall health
care.  As we shall see below, this finding is inconsistent with data on insurance coverage and may
be an artifact of using insurance claims to estimate private spending.
D.  The Supply of Mental Health Services
                                                       
7 These data are based on unpublished information from the Inventory of Mental Health Organizations collected by
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the USDHHS, 1996.13
There are a great variety of organizations and professionals that supply mental health
services, not limited to traditional medical care providers.  For example, in the state of
Massachusetts one could receive office-based psychotherapy from any of the following licensed
providers: primary care physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, counselors, and
nurses.  The services provided by each of these professions are paid for by public and private
insurance plans.  Similarly, inpatient psychiatric care might be provided in the medical-surgical
section of a general hospital, a general hospital psychiatric unit, a private psychiatric hospital or a
state mental hospital.  In some cases the functions of these various suppliers are differentiated and
in others they offer services that appear to be close substitutes (Goldman and Skinner, 1989).
Table 2 describes the types of organizations that offer specialty mental health services in
the U.S. and their nominal levels of spending in 1969 and 1994.  Note the dramatic shifts in
patterns of spending within the hospital sector and between hospital and non-hospital
organizations over time.  For example, state mental hospitals accounted for about 55% of all
specialty mental health spending in 1969 compared to roughly 25% in 1994.  General hospitals
accounted for 9% of spending in 1969 compared to 16% in 1994.  Community based treatment
programs (which include mental health centers) accounted for 7% of spending in 1969 and 11% in
1994.  These changes in the roles of suppliers of mental health care also reflect the emergence of
markets that has taken place over the past 40 years.  Even public funds are increasingly allocated
via markets.  Insurance mechanisms like Medicaid have grown in importance over time.  Public
managed care programs turn over operations of systems of care to private organizations.
Whereas publicly owned and operated mental hospitals dominated the supply of care in the 1950s
and 1960s, privately owned non-profit hospitals, mental health centers and clinics now play a
central role, as do private for-profit organizations.  These new treatment sites emphasize14
outpatient therapy, management of drug treatments, partial hospital services, rehabilitation and
case management services.
Psychiatrists and psychologists account for less than half of mental health professionals.
While there were about 33,500 psychiatrists and nearly 70,000 psychologists in 1995, social
workers, counselors, and family therapists accounted for 94,000, 61,000 and 46,000 practitioners
respectively.  Individuals with higher income and private insurance receive mental health care
from physicians, psychologists, or social workers specializing in mental health services.  Shifting
patterns of supply correspond to altered approaches to treating mental illnesses.
The treatment of mental illnesses has changed dramatically over the past 40 years, in part
due to scientific changes in treatment technology such as pharmaceutical innovation (Berndt,
Cockburn and Griliches, 1997; Grob, 1991), new methods of organizing elements of treatment
(Stein and Test, 1980), and improved approaches to brief psychotherapy.  Changes in the
organization and financing of mental health services have also contributed to changing treatment
patterns (Mechanic, 1989).  In particular, limits on insurance coverage for inpatient days or
outpatient visits, financial incentives to reduce hospital stays and payment arrangements which
reward health plans for reducing overall health care spending have contributed to shifts in
treatment of mental and addictive disorders (Harrow and Ellis, 1992; Frank and McGuire, 1996).
Various types of mental health services have been posited to be substitutes.  Research based in
HMOs and publicly funded treatment programs provides evidence indicating that community
based outpatient treatments are substitutes in production for inpatient hospital care (see
Weisbrod, 1983; Stein and Test, 1980; Hoult et al., 1981; Finch et al., 1992; Callahan et al.,
1995).  Similarly for psychotherapy services, outcomes evaluations suggest that there are a range
of professions trained in psychotherapy that produce comparable clinical gains to patients,15
implying that these professions are substitutes in production of psychotherapy treatment (Knesper,
1989).
There is also mounting evidence that for certain specific illnesses pharmaceutical
treatments can substitute for psychotherapy (Elkin et al., 1986; Kupfer et al., 1993).  Berndt,
Frank and McGuire (1997) offer evidence that drugs and psychotherapy are also substitutes in
demand.  Empirical analyses of cross-price responses of demand for social workers’ and
psychologists’ services relative to psychiatrists’ indicates that a substantial segment of the services
delivered by each profession are also close substitutes in demand (Fairbank, 1989; Frank, 1985).
Data on medical practice patterns indicate that there is considerable disagreement about
how medical treatments of all types, health and mental health care, should be used.  Holding other
factors constant, the likelihood of receiving a particular treatment can vary dramatically based on
a patient’s residence (Phelps, 1998).  Phelps and Mooney (1993) contend that much of the
variation in practice is due to beliefs, information, and learning at the individual physician level.  If
variation is unrelated to differences in patient need or benefit, it will cause significant welfare loss.
In the mental health area, variation in treatment tends to be greater than in medical care overall
(Phelps, Handbook).  This may, in part, be explained by the wide range of professions (with their
theoretical orientations) and modalities (with their patterns of costs and incentives) that supply
treatment to individuals with a particular illness.  It may also reflect greater clinical uncertainty.
With more disagreement among clinicians about proper treatment, welfare losses from treatment
not related to benefits may as a result be larger in the mental health area.
8
E.  Managed Behavioral Health Care
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“optimal point,” the welfare loss depends on the shape of the total benefit schedule.  A flat marginal benefit
function, associated with an elastic demand will imply a relatively low welfare loss.16
Managed care is transforming the health care sector generally, and may be having more of
an impact on mental health than in health care.  Employers, government and other purchasers are
bargaining for lower prices and monitoring treatment patterns.  The response to the new spirit of
prudent purchasing of health care services has been an acceleration in the growth of managed care
organizations.  Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), Point of Service (POS) plans and Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) accounted for 73% of the insured population in 1995
(PPRC, 1997).  State governments have moved to strengthen the bargaining power of buyers of
health care by encouraging the creation of purchasing alliances that enable smaller purchasers of
group health insurance to command more choice at more advantageous prices.  State Medicaid
plans and the federal Medicare program are all experiencing rapid growth in enrollment of
beneficiaries in managed care organizations that bear significant financial risk.
A striking development in mental health and substance abuse has been the development of
so-called managed behavioral health care carve-outs.  Traditionally, the purchaser, usually an
employer, contracted with a single insurance plan to cover a full range of health risks.
Increasingly, however, purchasers of health insurance are offering beneficiaries a range of plans.
Purchasers may also “carve out” certain benefits, which means that they separate the health
insurance function by disease or service category and contract separately for the management of
those risks.  This carve-out in insurance need not be associated with “managed care,” but it
virtually always is.
There are three forms of carve-outs found in the MHSA health sub-sector, with potentially
distinct economic impacts.  They are: a) payer specialty carve-outs from all health plans; b) payer
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specialty carve-outs from only indemnity and PPO type arrangements; and c) individual health
plan carve-outs to specialty vendors.
The two forms of payer carve-outs are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.  In Figure 1,
enrollees have a choice among a traditional indemnity insurance plan and managed care plans (e.g.
an HMO and a PPO).  The payer in this case writes a separate contract with a specialty vendor,
for the carved out service (e.g. behavioral health), to manage a segment of the risk in the
traditional plan.  Some well-known carve-out programs are of this type, the Massachusetts
Medicaid (Callahan, et al., 1995; Frank and McGuire, 1997; and Beinecke, et al., 1996) and the
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (Huskamp, 1997; Ma and McGuire, 1998; Merrick,
1997).  In this case, a carve-out eliminates a traditional indemnity plan for behavioral health care,
ensuring that all behavioral health care will be managed.  The payer also intervenes in the
competitive process by preventing the traditional plan from competing on the basis of the
behavioral health benefit (or other service carve-outs).
The payer may entirely remove the carved-out service from the market for competing
(otherwise) integrated health plans.  Figure 2 shows the case where enrollees choose among
competing health plans for all of their healthcare except for the carved-out service.  Behavioral
healthcare for the State of Ohio employees and for employees and dependents of Pacific Bell are
organized in such a fashion (Goldman, McColloch, and Sturm, 1998).  Enrollees are not given a
choice of plan for the carved out service, although a payer would typically use a competitive
process to choose the carve-out vendor.
The third major form of carve-out arrangement is illustrated by Figure 3.  In this case,
enrollees have a choice of health plan for all services.  Health plans choose to manage certain
services such as mental health or cancer care by sub-contracting with a specialized managed care18
organization.  In this case, the carve-out is an element of the competitive strategy adopted by a
health plan.  The payer may set general requirements for plans to meet, but does not specify
organizational form.  For example, an employer might contract with the Prudential HMO in St.
Louis, which in turn carves out MH/SA to Merit Behavioral Health, Inc.
At present, mental health carve-out contracts are a rapidly growing feature of health
insurance.  According to Oss (1997), approximately 53 million people are enrolled in carve-out
programs of all types.  Between 20 and 25 million people are enrolled in so-called risk-based
carve-out contracts (whereby the carve-out vendor assumes some or all of the financial risk for
claims), which account for about 60% of the total revenue of firms that manage MHSA benefits.
Carve-outs are more common among larger firms than smaller firms.  Umland (1995) reports that
35% of employers with 5,000 or more employees were contracting with a specialty MHSA carve-
out vendor compared with a rate of about 3% for firms with fewer than 500 employees.
Carve-outs are an important new institutional feature in mental health and substance
abuse.  Although carve-outs exist for other conditions, they are most common in the care of
MH/SA.  To understand why carve-outs are part of the MH/SA landscape and what their effects
are, we need to turn to issues of moral hazard and adverse selection covered in the next two
sections.
III. Private Insurance Markets, Moral Hazard, and Mental Health Care
Private insurance markets have long offered insurance for mental health coverage on much
more limited terms than for general health care coverage.  Most Americans who obtain health
insurance coverage through their employers have some coverage for mental health and substance
abuse treatment, but it is rarely on the same terms as for other medical care.  Over 90% of all19
employees covered by employer sponsored health insurance have mental health coverage.  This is
true of employees of both large and small firms (BLS, 1996).
9  In 1993, large employers offered
insurance plans with more restrictive coverage for mental health care than other services 86% of
the time for inpatient benefits and 97% of the time for outpatient benefits.  The corresponding
figures for small employers were 85% and 99% respectively.  The 1993 data offer evidence
suggesting an erosion in coverage from the 1980s (Buck and Umland, 1997).  It is important to
note that the mere fact that more health plans establish limits for MH/SA coverage that they did in
previous years does not mean that financial protection is less overall.  Establishing that would
require a more complete consideration of the terms of coverage.  Typically, private insurance
limits the number of reimbursable days of inpatient mental health care to 30, and the number of
outpatient visits to between 20 and 30.  Outpatient care generally carries 50% cost sharing (in
about 54% of all policies).  Lifetime spending limits are common for both inpatient and outpatient
mental health care (in 40% of health plans).
10  The upper limit on plan cost sharing is usually
defined as a limit on reimbursable visits or plan spending.
11
In sum, mental health and substance abuse insurance coverage provides some coverage for
low ranges of spending but leaves households unprotected against more expensive and potentially
financially ruinous treatment.  It is these observations along with the history of stigmatization that
have led mental health advocacy groups to focus so much effort on obtaining “parity” in the terms
of benefit design in private insurance for MH/SA and general medical care.  The first principle of
optimal insurance is that insurance ought to cover high-end expenses (where the marginal utility
                                                       
9  In 1993-94, 82% of employees of large firms and 66% of employees of small firms participated in employer
sponsored health plans (Unpublished data from the Employee Benefit Survey of the BLS).
10  All data except the level of day and visit limits reported in this paragraph are from the Employee Benefit Survey
of the BLS.20
of money is greater) (Arrow, 1963).  A higher demand response for mental health might imply
different cost sharing arrangements for mental health services in a “second best” world, but this
does not explain the presence of coverage limits.  Optimal insurance in principle would still imply
better high-end coverage, a different pattern of coverage than what is observed.  The traditional
explanations for differences in coverage and apparent failures in the insurance market are moral
hazard and adverse selection.
A.  Evidence of Moral Hazard
Since the 1950s, coverage of treatment for mental illness under private insurance has been
controversial because of perceptions that psychotherapy was discretionary and its use would be
greatly affected by insurance (McGuire, 1981).  Insurers argued that equal coverage for health
and mental health services would create a “cost control” problem.  The moral hazard argument
for special treatment of mental health care is based on the proposition that demand response to
insurance coverage for mental health services is greater than that of other medical services and
therefore the welfare loss from coverage is larger while the risk spending benefits are similar
(Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970).  During the 1960s and 1970s, the demand response of mental
health services to the terms of insurance was studied by examining the experiences of large
insured populations.  The federal employees health benefit program was frequently studied
because claims data were available for this population and because coverage under the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield high option plan was quite generous (Reed, 1974; Von Korff and Kramer,
1978; Sharfstein and Hustead, 1978).  Other large insured populations studies are summarized in
Frank and McGuire (1986).  These included the United Mine Workers, Blue Cross of Michigan
and Massachusetts, Group Health of Puget Sound, the United Auto Workers Health Plan,
                                                                                                                                                                                  
11  In 1996, Congress passed a so-called mental health parity law requiring dollar limits on mental health coverage21
CHAMPUS and the State of Washington employees among others.  The empirical problem of
separating adverse selection effects (persons more likely to use coverage choose better coverage)
from the moral hazard problem (better coverage leads to demand response) was not addressed in
this early work.
In the 1980s a number of econometric analyses made use of cross sectional surveys to
investigate the magnitude of demand response for ambulatory mental health services, the services
thought to be most responsive to cost sharing (McGuire, 1981; Horgan, 1986; Taube, Kessler and
Burns, 1986; Watts, Scheffler and Jewell, 1986).
12  This first generation of econometric models
focused on estimating the demand response of ambulatory mental health care use to differences in
the cost-sharing provisions across private insurance plans.  The empirical models of demand were
built on simple assumptions about the price schedule and consumer expectations (Manning and
Frank, 1992).  Annual number of visits (or dollars) were assumed to be the relevant decision unit,
consumers were assumed to face a constant price.  Consumers formulated their demand at the
beginning of the annual decision-period.  Insurance coverage for mental health is rarely described
by a single price block, such as constant 50% coinsurance.  Much more frequently there are two
or even three blocks.  Figure 4 shows a three-block schedule that would result from a deductible,
a covered region and a limit on coverage.  Empirical studies during the 1980s used an “average”
price, and related this to quantity used.  The block structure of pricing builds in a relation between
use and average price unrelated to demand response (e.g., with a declining block price, average
price and use are negatively correlated).  In principle, instrumental variables might deal with this,
but this is a highly imperfect way to address this measurement issue.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to be the same as for other conditions.  Visit and day limits remain permissible.
12 There is a more limited literature on the demand for inpatient psychiatric care.  See, for example, Scheffler and
Watts (1986).22
The models estimated during the 1980’s under a variety of approaches to measuring out-
of- pocket costs were so-called two part models of demand (Manning et al., 1981).  In the first
part, the impact of cost sharing on the probability that an individual would use any mental health
services was estimated using a logit or a probit model.  The second part estimated the effect of
cost sharing on the level of utilization (often subject to a logarithmic transformation) of mental
health care conditional on some use of services.  The second stage was usually estimated using
ordinary least squares.  The first generation of econometric research resulted in similar findings
across studies: that ambulatory mental health services were highly responsive to cost sharing.
Studies generally could not make a direct comparison to responsiveness in health care, but they
typically arrived at a conclusion that demand for ambulatory mental health care was more
responsive to cost sharing than ambulatory medical services.  Those results were based on non-
experimental assignment of individuals to insurance plans, and were subject to selection
problems.
13  Contending with the bias introduced by selection of insurance condition in general
health as well as mental health was a primary rationale for mounting the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment (HIE).
The RAND HIE improved upon earlier studies of demand response by randomly assigning
families to insurance conditions, minimizing the problems of the correlation of insurance and use
introduced by unobserved variables.  Over and above this central virtue of an experimental design,
the HIE made dramatic improvements in the measurement of key variables that plagued earlier
studies.  Rather than relying on patient or provider reports about use, the HIE (RAND
functioning as a third-party payer) directly observed what was used and when.  Prices charged and
paid were also directly observed, obviating the need to use the self-reported ranges and averages
                                                       
13  McGuire (1981) used an instrumental variable approach to correct for endogenous insurance coverage.  Other23
from earlier work.  Finally, measures of health and mental health status, along with other
covariates likely to influence demand, were measured much better in the HIE.
Random assignment and better measurement were great helps, but the problems
introduced by the non-constant price schedules described by Figure 4 remained.  Every HIE plan
included a stop loss that limited a family's out-of-pocket spending to $1,000 or less.  A family in a
50% plan with a $750 stop loss would, for example, have all care completely paid for, once they
spent $1,500 during a year.  A family with any high cost treatment early in a year, or any
foreseeable treatment (such as long-term psychotherapy) would rationally treat the marginal price
of care as free, just like a family in the free care plan.  Interpreting differences in use between the
50% plan and the free care plan, as well as other plans, requires confronting the issue of family's
expectations about spending.
Data collection for the HIE took place in the mid-1970s.  Early empirical work on the HIE
(Newhouse et al., 1981; Manning et al., 1986, Wells et al., 1982) compared plans on the basis of
“plan response” coinsurance only, for example users in the 50% plan to the free care plan.  This
does not yield a simple price elasticity estimate because the price change is averaged over stop
losses.  Later research also dealt explicitly with expectations, which the omnibus response to plan
treated only implicitly.  With the addition of some structural assumptions about how expectations
were formed, estimates of the demand response could be derived.
Keeler, Manning, and Wells (1988) examined the demand of a subset of users in the
RAND HIE who began mental health (or general health) treatment while far away (in dollar
terms) from the limit on out-of-pocket expenses.  They assumed that individuals would foresee, at
the initiation of care, all the care that would eventually be used in a given episode of care, but that
                                                                                                                                                                                  
studies had no method for dealing with selection.24
individuals did not foresee that they might exceed the out-of-pocket limit from other episodes.
They show individuals in families with full insurance (free care) coverage used about four times
more ambulatory mental health care than do those with virtually no coverage (95% cost sharing).
This is roughly double the response reported using a similar methodology for ambulatory medical
care.  Research on other data dealt with the issue of block pricing and demand.  Ellis (1986)
proposed an empirical approach which builds on the model developed by Keeler, Newhouse and
Phelps (1977).  He studied a mental health benefit where there was an increasing block price (no
deductible, cost sharing up to a limit on outpatient spending).  Ellis assumed that consumers
would base consumption decisions on their “expected” end of year price.  Ellis and McGuire
(1986) applied this model to estimate price elasticities of demand.  This research also showed
mental health services to be relatively price elastic.  In sum, nearly all the available evidence,
experimental or observational, points in the direction of greater price response for ambulatory
mental health than other health care services.
Table 3 summarizes the cumulative evidence on the demand response of ambulatory
mental health services to cost sharing provisions in insurance.  Note that the magnitudes of the
price responses vary considerably.  The relative response compared to ambulatory medical care is,
however, quite consistent when comparison was possible.  For example, Taube and colleagues
(1986), using the NMCUES survey, report price elasticity estimates for mental health care that
are four times those estimated for general ambulatory health care. Similarly, Horgan (1986)
obtained elasticity estimates from the NMCES data set for mental health care that were 2.75 times
those for ambulatory medical care.  The relative elasticity estimate for mental health and medical
care found in the RAND HIE was 2.66.  The main policy implication of the empirical literature on
the demand response of ambulatory mental health care to cost sharing is that there is an efficiency25
rationale for psychotherapy (the predominant form of ambulatory treatment) to be covered at a
higher level of cost sharing than other types of ambulatory health care.  Thus, in the absence of
other forms of rationing or cost control, the strong evidence showing relatively high demand
response implies higher cost sharing for psychotherapy.
14  Based on the empirical results from the
HIE (and some assumptions about risk aversion), Manning and Marquis (1992) estimate that 50%
cost sharing for psychotherapy is optimal (second best).
The moral hazard issue continues to be debated in the context of managed care (Scheffler
et al, 1993).  While there exists a growing body of research showing that managed care
arrangements result in substantial savings in mental health and substance abuse (together referred
to as behavioral health) spending paid through insurance, this evidence pertains primarily to the
effect of “managed care” on levels of spending, not the response of spending to the terms of
coverage (Christianson et al., 1995; Goldman, McCulloch and Sturm, 1997; Ma and McGuire,
1997; Calahan et al., 1995; Brisson et al., 1997).  Demand response in managed care is an
important area for study.  The reason the subject of demand response must be looked at afresh is
that the control of moral hazard in managed in managed care is done with other mechanisms in
addition to demand-side cost sharing.
B.  Rationing in Managed Care
Assessing the cost control or moral hazard problem in the context of managed care
requires one to change the conceptions of rationing that have been employed in studying fee-for-
service and indemnity insurance arrangements.  Managed care in general and managed behavioral
health care (MBHC) in particular address the moral hazard problem with tactics that ration care
without relying on money prices paid by the consumer (Mechanic, Schlesinger, and McAlpine,
                                                       
14 This conclusion follows if a consumer demand curve is given a normative interpretation as a marginal benefit26
1995).  Managed behavioral health care organizations (MBHO) must often allocate treatment
resources subject to a prospectively set budget for serving a defined number of people.  Features
of rationing within managed behavioral health care organizations include:
• Establishment of a network of selected providers to furnish specialized services to a
defined population of enrollees.
 
• Directing individuals to levels of care (e.g. inpatient hospital, residential, outpatient) based
on clinical criteria about appropriate matches of clinical circumstances and provider
capabilities.
 
• Writing contracts to providers that include financial incentives to limit care.
 
• Application of concepts of medical necessity to determine the need and benefits from
continuing treatment at differing levels of care.
 
• Feedback of information to clinicians on treatment patterns relative to peers and clinical
norms.
The MBHO makes these rationing choices in the context of either: a) markets where
potential enrollees may choose among health plans based on quality indicators, price and other
aspects of reputation and/or b) regulatory standards set by payers that require health plans to
achieve certain specified levels of performance.
15  From the very beginning of research on the
economics of health insurance (e.g. Pauly, 1968), when the moral hazard problem was addressed
exclusively by demand-side cost sharing, it was assumed that rationing took place in an
economically rational fashion.  As a price was introduced, the units of quantity that were
“rationed out” were those that were the least valuable to the consumers.  Consumers/patients
were assumed to be utility-maximizing price takers in the face of the prices presented to them by
their insurance coverage, implying that the consumer could buy as little or as much health care as
he or she wished at the going price, and did so to maximize utility.  The validity of these
                                                                                                                                                                                  
schedule.
15 For example, it is common to find employers requiring MBHOs to achieve certain access standards, to facilitate
entry into treatment and to leave patients largely satisfied with the treatment process (see IOM, 1997).27
assumptions have, of course, generated thousands of academic journal pages.  For example, Rice
(1998) has argued that the rationing mechanism economists employ is not correct in a positive or
descriptive sense, in that low value units are not necessarily those rationed out after prices rise.
With managed care, the assumption of the price-taking consumer can no longer be
maintained.  The essence of managed care – its very rationale – is the ability to ration care without
imposing financial risk on consumers.  Whatever one’s view on the workability of the assumption
of price-taking consumers in times gone by,
16 rationing by price-taking consumers certainly is
indefensible in a health plan with managed care.  Recent research on the economics of managed
care has begun to characterize rationing within managed care, working along two tracks in
modeling the effect of managed care.  One approach views managed care organizations as setting
quantities for individuals who may be heterogeneous with respect to severity of illness and
demand (Baumgardner, 1991; Glazer and McGuire, 1998; Pauly and Ramsey, 1997).  This
approach views managed care as specifying what a person, given a demand curve, would get in
terms of services under managed care.  Note that if heteregeneous patients get the same quantity
of services, managed care rations in an inefficient manner.  In this case, shifting resources from
consumers with low valuation to those with high valuation could improve welfare.  A second line
of research proposes that managed care organizations, ration by “shadow prices” (Keeler, Carter
and Newhouse, 1998; Frank, Glazer, and McGuire, 1998).  In this approach, it is “as if”
consumers were charged a price, and the managed care plan gave them all services that were
valued above the shadow price and denied care for all uses for which the value was below the
shadow price.  In this characterization of managed care the shadow price determines a “need” or
benefit threshold that a patient must attain in order to qualify for treatment.  Rationing by shadow
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prices is efficient in the sense that this form of rationing analyzes the marginal benefit of services
to all users.
The fact that managed care rations without demand prices has important implications for
the discussion of “parity” for mental health coverage and generally for the efficiency of benefit
designs for mental health versus general medical care.  In our discussion of moral hazard above
we noted that the empirical evidence showing greater demand response to cost sharing for mental
health care relative to general medical care in the context of fee-for-service-indemnity insurance
arrangements implies that it would be efficient to cover ambulatory mental health care differently
from general health care.  This is an argument against parity for MH/SA.  Normative conclusions
about coverage change are altered under managed care.  For example, Ramsey and Pauly (1998)
consider the roles for quantity-type managed care rationing and demand-side cost sharing in a
model in which quantity received by the consumer is the minimum of what would be demanded,
or what the managed care firm would supply.  They are concerned with the optimal combination
of the two rationing instruments.  Some quantity rationing is always part of the optimal policy,
and it is unclear how different demand responses fit into the story.
In the case in which rationing is only by shadow prices, we can show clearly the
potentially major impact of superimposing a new rationing mechanism for quantity determination.
In this case, the higher demand elasticity of mental health services does not imply a higher shadow
price, where this form of rationing is used, is in contrast to the usual optimal insurance result.  We
first consider the problem diagrammatically.  Figures 5a and 5b characterize the demand curves
for general medical care and mental health care in accord with empirical findings from the
literature.  The demand for mental health services is more price elastic than is the demand for
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medical care.  We begin by imposing a shadow price of q to ration both types of services.  At this
initial shadow price the managed care plan would provide g dollars in general medical care
spending and m dollars of mental health care for an individual with these two demand curves.  If
we increase the shadow price to q’ for both areas of care, which represents stricter rationing, the
result is g’ and m’ levels of spending on general medical and mental health care, respectively.  The
higher elasticity for mental health services means that the cut back in services for mental health
will be greater than that in other service areas.
The efficiency implications of a change in shadow price under managed care are quite
different from comparable changes in benefit design under indemnity insurance.  Because the
shadow price is an “as if” price consumers do not actually bear more financial risk when it rises.
There is no risk/inefficiency trade-off taking place to determine the optimal shadow price.  The
only efficiency issue is the allocation of resources between health care and mental health care,
which is done efficiently when the shadow prices are equal, irrespective of the relative demand
responses.
This can be shown more formally within a model that will first be used to define efficient
rationing, and later be used to compare efficient rationing with that which may occur in the
presence of selection incentives.
17  Consider a planner seeking to maximize net benefits subject to
a budget, for a given set of enrollees in a plan.  The planner chooses the level of rationing qs, for
each of s services.  Each service quantity is expressed in dollars, assuming price is normalized to
$1.  Use of each service for each enrollee is a function of its own shadow price only.
                                                       
17 The discussion in this section has benefited greatly from extensive discussions with Jacob Gazer and is closely
related to the discussion in Frank, Glazer and McGuire (1998).30
Specifically, suppose a plan has a membership consisting of Nt members of type t,
N N t
t
= ￿ , where a type of person corresponds to a valuation that person places on health care
services.  Person of type t has a benefit function Bt(m1t(q1), m2t(q2)…mst(qs)), where qs is the
shadow price for service s and mst(qs) is the spending type t can expect if the shadow price is qs.
18
Note that qs is set in common for all users of service s.  What each person gets is dependent on
their “need” or marginal benefit.  Then Bt(•) is the person’s valuation of all the elements of
expected spending.  With this notation, total benefits to all enrollees are
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Since rationing by shadow price implies Bts is the same for all types, (4) implies that
(4’) Bts = " 1      s
                                                       
18 Consumers value spending on the various services.  Spending is determined by the shadow-price rationing and
expressed as mst (qs).  Diagramatically, the relation between q and spending can be seen in Figure 5.31
All shadow prices should be set equal to one.  All services would be subject to the same level of
rationing and that every dollar of spending would generate at least a dollar in health care benefits.
The implication of the first best is that the managed care organization should have a budget
sufficient to cover the costs of all services implied by the efficient level of rationing.
It should be recognized that the condition given in equation (4) is based on the assumption
that the demand response for a service (e.g. cardiac care) is the same for each person in the
patient type category t.  The demand response may, of course, vary across services within a
patient type category.  This will be important for the selection analyses presented in Section IV.C.
This normative problem could be transformed into a second-best analysis by maximizing
the value of spending to the members of the plan subject to a given budget, rather than
maximizing benefits less cost.  The second-best analysis is more general and covers the case in
which the goal is to maximize welfare subject to given levels of public funds or perhaps a set of
capitation payments.  It is straightforward to show that the result in (4’) is altered so that the
marginal benefit of spending in all services will be equalized to a new shadow price, the value of
the marginal dollar given the budget.  This shadow price is one, of course, at the first-best level of
spending.  It is above (below) one when the health budget is set below (above) the first-best level.
Two points flow from this analysis that are important for the economics of mental health.
First, if managed care rations by shadow price, and does so efficiently, providing full coverage
(parity) for mental health services can improve efficiency by increasing financial protection with
no additional loss due to moral hazard, a point that has been anticipated in some policy
discussions (Frank, Koyanagi and McGuire, 1997; National Advisory Mental Health Council,
1997; Sturm, 1997).  Second, efficient rationing implies rationing equally across service areas, in
the sense of setting the same shadow price across services.  Efficiency conditions imply equality in32
shadow prices irrespective of demand elasticities.  (Note that the demand-response term, mst
' ,
drops out of (4).)
The normative implications of this model of rationing are parallel to those that underlie
models used in cost-effectiveness analysis (Weinstein, 1995).  The manner in which cost-
effectiveness information has been proposed for use in resource allocation is consistent with the
simple model proposed above.  Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1972) propose an approach to
efficient rationing within a budget using estimates of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
derived from specific health programs.  QALYs were initially designed as a means of developing a
common metric for evaluating heterogeneous health outcomes in a fashion which takes account of
individual preferences for different health states (see Kaplan, 1995 for a review).  While that work
focuses on rank ordering health treatment programs in terms of the QALYs they yield in order to
find the incremental intervention, the point here is that budget allocation process across classes of
“incremental” interventions should allocate funds so that the health benefit per dollar (perhaps as
measured by QALYs) is equal.
19
In the analysis just conducted, we have assumed that shadow prices were the only
rationing device, whereas, in fact, demand-side price rationing is likely to be going on at the same
time.  A short-side model in which utilization is the minimum of demand and supply is the
approach noted above by Pauly and Ramsey.  Another is a bargaining model in which utilization is
a compromise between what the patient wants at the price he or she pays and what the seller
wants to supply given the incentives and constraints it faces (Ellis and McGuire, 1990).  Any
                                                       
19 The analysis would be altered if we assumed, Baumgardner-like, that managed care plans ration by quantity
setting, instead of assuming, Keeler, Carter, and Newhouse-like, that plans ration by a shadow price.
Maximization of benefits less costs with respect to ms with the implied constraint that mst = ms for all t yields a
public-goods like condition in (4).  The weighted marginal benefits must be equalized across services.  In this
altered analysis, the “expected” marginal benefits are equalized across services.33
supply-side instrument will have the virtue that rationing is being accomplished without imposing
financial risk on consumers, and, therefore, is likely to be used “first” in putting together an
optimal payment system (Ellis and McGuire, 1993).  Supply-side policies, especially “one size fits
all” types, may run the risk of not respecting consumer preferences.  Pauly and Ramsey’s (1998)
approach suggests one way to capture this.  Supply side policies also do not address initial visits
very well.  The literature in health economics on optimal combinations of demand and supply-side
policies is thin, and reasonable incorporation of managed care tactics in normative models is only
beginning (Ma and McGuire, 1997).
Considerations of optimal payment systems in mental health encounter the same issues
about patient and provider motivation as do such discussions in the general field of health
economics.  The assumption of rational, utility-maximizing, price-taking consumers with fixed
preferences seems, if anything, less convincing in demand for mental health care than for general
health.
Interpretation of Demand: The normative interpretation of mental health care demand in
the fee-for-service indemnity insurance world has long been problematic.  Long standing issues of
asymmetric information and imperfect agency relationships that were noted early in the study of
health care markets (Arrow, 1963) temper the normative interpretation of all health care demand
functions as marginal benefit schedules.  The demand for mental health care has a special set of
constraints on consumer information.  Demand for mental health services may be influenced by
fear of stigma, Veblen’s “bandwagon” effects (McGuire, 1981) and unclear information about
efficacy of specific treatments.  In addition, many mental disorders affect the capacity of
individuals to make decisions in their own best interests (Rubin, 1978).  For these illnesses,
placing a strong normative interpretation on observed demand behavior is unlikely to be justified.34
The relation between behavior and normative marginal benefit schedules under managed
care arrangements may differ from that in fee-for-service indemnity insurance for many reasons
related to new forms of rationing, including creation of managed care provider networks, using
payment systems that depart from simple fee-for-service arrangements, and the use of utilization
management techniques and information feedback.  Managed care also may alter the traditional
agency relationships between patient and clinician (Blomquist, 1991; Mechanic, 1998). Providers
seeking to be part of a managed care network must balance patient, managed care organization,
and their own economic interest differently than under FFS.  If provider actions influence demand,
the relationship between demand-side price and quantity consumed must be constructed with a
whole new set of factors in the ceterus paribus under managed care.  In general, since managed
care mechanisms are intended to affect rationing, we can expect that the positive demand curve
will change.  Conducting research on these changes is an important element of the current
research agenda in mental health, as well as in health services.
We can speculate about what changes we might expect in demand behavior.  If forces to
ration care in addition to demand-side prices are in play, the change in quantity utilized with
respect to a change in price is probably smaller.  This emerges from a short-side model (Pauly and
Ramsey, 1998), because some price changes for some consumers do not affect quantity since the
supply constraint is binding.  It would also emerge from a bargaining model because the quantity
used is a compromise, and even if “desired demand” changes by the same amount, actual use is a
weighted average of desired demand and desired supply (which does not change).  Thus, here too,
alternative rationing dampens demand response.
The normative view of such changes must be approached cautiously for reasons stated
above.  Nevertheless, at the very least the “cost control problem” that has been of such a central35
concern in mental health policy is potentially attenuated with managed care.  The welfare loss
from equal coverage, or parity, would also likely be reduced.
C.  Managed Care, Supply Side Incentives and Moral Hazard: Evidence
Alternative methods of organizing and paying for mental health and substance abuse
services within private insurance, Medicaid and Medicare have received increasing attention from
researchers and policy makers in the U.S. since the mid-1980s.  Similarly, Britain has recently
begun to use supply side incentives to affect resource allocation in the primary care and specialty
mental health sectors (Knapp, 1997).  To date most of the evidence on the impact of payment and
organizational arrangements on utilization is based on the U.S. experience.
Research and policy debates about supply side payment incentives have primarily been
focused on hospital and health plan payment schemes.  Prior to the mid-1980s payments by
insurers in the U.S. were commonly made on the basis of retrospectively incurred costs or charges
for hospital care and charges or customary fees for professional services (IOM, 1995).  Since the
mid-1980s payments have increasingly been made prospectively and are based on days or
discharges for hospitals and on a per capita basis for health plans and groups of health care
professionals.
Prospective payment systems were introduced in order to give providers incentives to
control costs.  The basic idea is to separate the level of payment, determined prospectively, from
the costs the provider incurs.  In practice, payment systems are not always completely
prospective, and may include some features, which, at least partially, reimburse costs.  In
Medicare’s Prospective Payment System for hospital discharges, there are outlier features for
some costs.  Medicare’s TEFRA system for paying psychiatric hospitals and psychiatric units of
general hospitals has explicit features that increase payments if a facility’s cost rises above a36
certain level (Cromwell et al., 1992).  State payment systems for Medicaid may include rebasing
features which, in effect, reimburse part of costs.  To capture elements of prospective and
retrospective payment that characterize actual payment systems, we can characterize a general
payment system in the following way:
(5) P = a + bC
where a is the prospective portion of payment that is unrelated to incurred costs and can be paid
in connection to any of the above mentioned units of payment (days, cases, per capita); b is what
has been referred to as the supply side cost sharing parameter (Ellis and McGuire, 1986;
Newhouse, 1996) indicating the portion of incurred costs, C, that are reimbursed in the payment
system.  Cost based reimbursement can be characterized by setting a = 0 and b = 1.  A pure form
of per case prospective payment for hospitals (similar to Medicare’s Prospective Payment System
or PPS) pays on the basis of admissions to hospitals, sets a = the average cost of a case, and b =
0.
20  A “mixed” system is in the general case, where a > 0 and 0 < b < 1.  One can use this
categorization for contracts to managed care organizations.  Under managed care arrangements in
the mental health and substance abuse area there are three dominant approaches to payment, all
based on the cost of care per capita for a defined population: pure capitation where the per capita
payment is set such that a = the average MH/SA costs per enrollee, and b = 0; mixed payment or
soft capitation where a > 0 and 0 < b < 1; and Administrative Services Only (ASO) contracts
where claims are reimbursed on a fee-for-services basis but the managed care organization is
judged and contract renewal is related to its performance in controlling spending.
                                                       
20 The average cost is typically based on actual costs in a previous year and is usually adjusted for the case mix of
the users of the service.  Case mix will be discussed in the context of risk adjusted capitation rates below.37
Representation of payment systems with a prospective and retrospective component, in a
mixed system, has also been useful in research on “optimal payment systems,” which may feature
only partial supply side cost sharing (with 0 < b < 1) for reasons of agency (Ellis and McGuire,
1986), or information issues (Newhouse, 1996).
21
1. Research on Hospital Payment Systems: The impact of payment arrangements on
inpatient psychiatric care has been the subject of many studies.
22  Analyses of natural experiments
within Medicare, Medicaid and several states which regulated hospital payments have formed the
foundation for the research.  In Medicaid, indicated that there were strong responses to various
forms of prospective payment relative to cost based reimbursement (Frank and Lave 1989; Lave
and Frank, 1990).  Studies of Medicaid also suggest that the responses to per case prospective
payments appear to be more complex than one might have expected.  For example, relative to
cost-based payment fewer psychiatric patients paid under per case prospective payment had very
short hospital stays (1 to 10 days) and fewer also had long stays (over 30 days) resulting in a
lower average length of stay under prospective payment.  Ellis and McGuire (1995) using data
from the state of New Hampshire found hospitals respond both to the level of payment (“a”) in
terms of quality competition, as well as to the degree of supply-side cost sharing (“b”).
Studies in Medicare used implementation of the PPS quantify general hospital response to
the new payment arrangement (Frank et al., 1987; Freiman et al., 1989; Lave et al., 1988).
23  The
estimated impacts of the new payment system showed length of stay reductions for inpatient
psychiatric care in the range of 17% to 25%.  The estimated effects of the initial implementation
                                                       
21 The average cost is typically based on actual costs in a previous year adjusted for inflation and is usually adjusted
for the case mix of the users of the service.  Case mix will be discussed in the context of risk adjusted capitation
rates below.
22 See Harrow and Ellis (1992) for a review of the early literature.
23  Most specialty mental health providers were exempt from PPS and paid under the mixed system, TEFRA.38
of PPS for general medical care was to reduce length of stay by between 9% and 12% (PROPAC,
1986).
Several states implemented all-payer rate setting programs in the 1970s and 1980s in an
effort to control hospital costs.  Rupp, Steinwachs and Salkever (1984) examined the impact of
the per case prospective payment method introduced in Maryland, finding evidence for decreases
in length of stay, and increases in re-admission rates.  Frank and Jackson (1989) studied the
introduction of prospectively set hospital budgets (a = historical budget adjusted for general
inflation and b=0) in two regions of New York State during the 1980s.  Compared to “control”
hospitals paid using a prospectively set per diem payment, prospectively set budgets led to
reduced admissions of between 16% and 22%.
In summary the evidence from the application of prospective payment methods to
hospitals suggests strong hospital responses to incentives to reduce costs and utilization of
psychiatric services.
2. Research on Managed Care and Capitation: The general form of a contract as a
“mixed system” contract can be applied to capitation and managed care.  Figure 6 illustrates forms
of contracts that are based on capitation arrangements that are commonly found in connection
with managed behavioral health contracts.  The horizontal axis measures actual costs incurred by
the managed care organization.  The vertical axis measures payments made to the managed care
organization.  The 45
0 line represents cost based reimbursement, that is payments equal incurred
costs.  The horizontal line at C represents “pure” capitation (a = C and b = 0).  The managed care
organization bears 100% of the financial risk for incurred costs per enrollee.  For managing care
of a population at spending levels to the left of T the managed care organization collects a profit
equal to the vertical distance between the line at C and the 45 degree line.  If spending exceeds T39
the managed care organization incurs a loss equal to the vertical distance between the line at C
and the 45
O line.  The financial incentive to restrain spending is clear.  Most HMOs and some
carve-out programs use this type of payment arrangement.
The line NEB represents a mixed or soft capitation payment system.  Under these types of
arrangements the payer sets a capitation target at T.  Thus, if the managed care organization
incurs costs per enrollee equal to T it will break even.  If the managed care organization incurs
costs between points L and M on Figure 6, payer and the managed care organization will share
the profit or loss according to the slope of the line segment EB (or b in our characterization of
payment above).  At levels of spending above M and below L the payers holds all the risk.  Profit
and losses are capped at spending level L and M.  This means that the managed care
organization’s maximum profit is EF and the maximum loss is AB.  This is illustrated in Figure 6
by the fact that line segment NE is parallel to the 45
O line.  Under the soft capitation payment
method there are incentives to reduce spending but they are weaker because the link between
payment and incurred costs has not been fully severed (b > 0).  One rationale for such
arrangements is concern that managed care organizations may “over manage” the mental health
benefit (possibly due to selection incentives discussed below).  A second rationale relates to the
fact that most payers are large relative to specialty managed behavioral care organizations and
thus are in a better position to bear risk.
2a. Evidence: The Early Experiences
Risk contracting for managed mental health care predates the specialty industry of
managed behavioral health care (MBHC).  Prepaid group practices and health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) have accepted risk contracts for MH/SA services, along with other health
care, for many years.  In general, these contracts are capitation contracts in which all the cost or40
claims risk is born by the prepaid group.  As part of the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE),
Manning and colleagues (1989) compared the cost and use of care by families assigned to a
prepaid group practice, the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, with that of families
assigned to receive free care in the fee-for-service sector.  Although enrollees with the two types
of insurance sought care at the same rate, the fee-for-service population had mental health
expenditure levels almost three times greater than enrollees in the prepaid health plan ($69.70 vs.
$24.60 in 1977 dollars).  Paula Diehr and colleagues compared the use of outpatient mental health
care in a fee-for-service unmanaged benefit plan, a staff model HMO, and an individual practice
association (IPA) prepaid plan for Washington State employees, with results that were consistent
with Manning’s (Diehr et al., 1984).  However, because the Washington employees chose their
plan and were not assigned to an insurance condition as in the Health Insurance Experiment, the
Diehr findings may at least partly reflect differences in each study group’s needs and not just an
effect of the plan.
Prepaid groups can exert direct managerial authority over the supply of mental health
services.  Indeed, by controlling the number of therapist hours available, they can almost directly
ration the volume of care to be provided.  Managed behavioral health care companies, however,
may have weaker incentives to reduce costs than prepaid groups do, and they typically have much
less direct control over their contracted providers.  Thus, the cost reductions from managed
behavioral health care should be expected to be more modest than from prepaid groups.
The literature on specific MBHC programs is relatively recent.  The initial experiences
reported by employers include some instances of large reductions in the costs of MH/SA care.
Hodgkin (1992) reviewed the early literature on the effects of utilization management, finding
very few studies that offered evaluation methods that could produce convincing results.  The lone41
study that was methodologically sound showed savings in the neighborhood of 10% to 15% on
total claims costs, a faint indication of what was to come.
2b. More Recent Evidence
The CHAMPUS program experimented with an “at risk” PPO for behavioral health
services during the late 1980s in the Tidewater, Virginia area.  That area was known to be a high
cost region with regard to MH/SA outlays.  The demonstration showed significant savings (about
31% below expected costs in the absence of the program) stemming largely from reduced use of
inpatient care.  In spite of the reported savings, there were clearly areas of considerable waste in
expenditures and difficulties in effectively running the program (Coulam and Gaumer, 1990).
24
A number of private corporations have adopted specialty MBHC carve-out programs.  It
is fairly common to see reports of reductions in claims costs of 40% to 50%.  The interpretation
of these changes is, of course, quite difficult.  Often, more than one change is made and
attributing cause and effect is difficult.  Within a plan, there can be considerable year-to-year
variation for unknown reasons (Dickey and Azeni, 1992; McGuire, 1994).  Finally, a version of
the “file-drawer” problem in research may be at work; only “good” (read “publishable”)
experience may see the light.
                                                       
24 The CHAMPUS program has continued to experiment with managed care.  The program is now subject to three
differing forms of managed care arrangements.  The National Utilization Management program works under a
CHAMPUS contract with a specialty MBHC vendor to provide pre-admission certification and concurrent review
on a nation wide basis.  The contract with the MBHC vendor does not place the vendor at any financial risk
related to utilization of MH/SA care.  The CRI program under CHAMPUS is a fixed price “at risk” contract that
is in place in Hawaii and California.  Finally, the Tidewater CPA arrangement continues to be in operation.  In
recent years the CRI and the general MBHC arrangement have realized the largest reductions in costs.  The
Tidewater plan reported a small increase in costs.  The absence of cost reductions in Tidewater during the 1989
to 1992 time period may be due to the substantial savings that were realized during the early years of the
program.  A 9% increase over 4 years that was reported for the CRI program is quite small for any health plan
during that time period.42
With these limitations in mind, we review the reports of the performance of Managed
Behavioral Health Care (MBHC) carve-out programs.  Key aspects of these studies are
summarized on Table 4.  As the Table indicates each of these natural experiments has taken place
in the context of different institutional arrangements.  Some carve-outs were implemented within
State Medicaid (Massachusetts and Utah) programs while others in privately insured populations
(the GIC and Pacific Bell).  The risk sharing arrangements also varied considerably.  In Utah a
“pure” capitation contract was phased-in, while in Massachusetts, the GIC and Medicaid
contracts shifted only a small amount of risk to the MBHC vendor.  The Pacific Bell ASO
contract involved no financial risk at all to the MBHC vendor.
Table 4 reports impressive reductions in mental health spending relative to fee-for-service
arrangements (the comparison condition for all the studies).  The estimated reductions in spending
range from -17% to -43%.  The reductions for the most part took place in the context of
programs that had historically experienced high levels of spending on mental health services, with
the exception of the Utah study.  While the observed savings across studies were in many respects
achieved by similar shifts in services utilization patterns, there are some important differences.
Savings were primarily realized by 1) reductions in use of inpatient hospital care (all studies), 2)
reductions in nominal prices paid to providers (Goldman et al., 1998; Ma and McGuire, 1998;
Callahan et al., 1995); and 3) reduced duration of outpatient treatment (Goldman et al 1998,
Huskamp, 1997).
The studies in Table 4 reflect changes in rates of utilization of any mental health and
substance abuse care for the insured populations.  Important differences in the utilization patterns
were observed across studies.  The Massachusetts Medicaid experience saw an initial increase in
use of behavioral health care following introduction of the carve-out program (Callahan et al.,43
1995).  After three years the increase in use had largely vanished (Frank, McGuire, Notman and
Woodward, 1996).  In the Pacific Bell study a significant increase in the percentage of enrollees
using any behavioral health care was estimated (a 17% rise).  In contrast the Massachusetts GIC
experienced very large reductions in the percentage of the population using behavioral health care
(20% to 30% reductions).  It is interesting to note that some companies such as Sterling-
Winthrop report dramatic increases in access to care (50% increase in rates of utilization), due to
expanded use of outpatient care, at the same time that claims cost were falling.  Reductions in
rates of use create concern because it may be indicative of reductions in access to care for
individuals that may benefit substantially from treatment.  Managed care programs are quite
complicated and use many methods of rationing to control use.  The studies discussed also reflect
heterogeneous populations and differences in other institutional features.  For this reason there are
as yet no clear explanations for why the response to managed care arrangements might vary so
strongly in terms of the percentage of the population using care.
Theory implies that the more high-powered incentives associated with pure capitation
should lead to greater cost reductions in comparison to lower-powered incentives with risk
sharing or ASO contracts.  Sturm (1997) pointed out, this pattern has not materialized in the
experience so far: large reductions have occurred even without high-powered incentives.  The
high/lower power of a contract is one dimension, but actual contracts can be quite complex,
especially with regard to their dynamic incentives.  The first Massachusetts Medicaid contract
made a fixed payment for administrative costs (giving incentives not to spend on administration
and managing care), weak incentives for cost reduction, and in some years ratchet effects which
create a link between targets in future years and performance in past years (Frank and McGuire,
1997).  A powerful incentive in this new and growing industry is what role contract performance44
will have on future business.  This may be the dominant incentive with respect to all current
contracts (Ma and McGuire, 1998), perhaps serving as an explanation of why large cost savings
emerge in many forms of contracts.  Relating experience to the form of the contract seems
particularly treacherous on the basis of current data, given the rich set of incentives that are
probably operative. Case studies are building an empirical base on which conclusions ultimately
can be drawn.
Although much work remains to be done about the magnitude of savings that can be
expected in particular circumstances and the connections between savings and contract features, it
seems clear that managed care can substantially reduce costs in MH/SA.  Some research has taken
place on the quality impact of managed care.  Generally, in comparing fee-for-service to capitated
managed care plans does not reveal a uniform quality impact one way or another (Miller and Luft,
1997).  In mental health, two studies have found that quality may be adversely affected in HMO-
style managed care (Wells, 1996; Lurie et al., 1992).  Merrick (1997) studied the pattern of claims
for persons hospitalized for major depression prior to and post the carve-out plan in the GIC plan
noted above.  Her results pointed to more appropriate patterns of care under the carve-out.  Re-
admissions did not rise, and contact with outpatient providers following discharge improved under
managed care.
There is as yet very little research on responses to differences in risk sharing arrangements
across MBHC plans.  Sorting out these explanations requires careful measurement of contractual
features and market circumstances facing MBHC vendors.  Thus, while there has been
considerable progress in estimating the gross spending and utilization responses to MBHC
contracts, we have a long way to go to understand the specific contractual and market
mechanisms that generate such changes in the delivery of mental health and substance abuse care.45
IV.  Insurance Markets, Adverse Selection and Mental Health Care
The special effort needed to control moral hazard in MH/SA has been put forward as one
reason why MH/SA services are organized and paid for differently than other types of health care.
Managed care represents a new set of institutions that appear to change the terms of Zeckhauser’s
(1970) dilemma, allowing moral hazard to be controlled without reduction in risk spreading
(Mechanic, 1997).  The speculation above that managed care can substitute for demand-side cost
sharing as a cost control device would suggest that insurance coverage for MH/SA should
improve with managed care, as the goal of risk spreading could be pursued with less moral hazard
cost.  Nevertheless, in the early and mid-1990s, when managed care was emerging, we observed
two significant developments in insurance markets related to MH/SA.  First, there was some
evidence of erosion of insurance coverage for MH/SA (Buck and Umland, 1997).  In particular,
the portion of health plans which imposed tight limits on coverage of MH/SA care appears to
have grown during the 1990s.  This is puzzling given the rapid expansion of enrollment in
managed care plans (PPRC, 1996).  A second development has been the growth of specialized
behavioral health carve-out programs (Frank, Huskamp, McGuire and Newhouse, 1996).
Appearance of coverages and insurance arrangements more generally reflect the profit-driven
considerations of adverse selection, as well as concerns for moral hazard.  As in the case of moral
hazard, evidence suggests that the forces of adverse selection may work more powerfully in
mental health than in health care.
In the context of insurance coverage for mental health services, conventional wisdom is
that high cost enrollees are attracted by relatively generous coverage provisions for mental health
and substance abuse care.  Competition among indemnity insurance plans may have resulted in46
inefficiently low levels of coverage for behavioral health care.  This was the basis of argument in
the 1980s that justified federal and state “mandated coverage” legislation requiring private
insurance to cover minimum levels of mental health care (McGuire and Montgomery, 1982;
Frank, 1989).
In the sections that follow, we review the evidence on selection in mental health and
substance abuse, discuss the policy responses by government in the context of fee-for-service
indemnity insurance contracts and then examine selection in the context of managed care.  This
discussion will point to explanations for the new institutional arrangements that are arising in the
MH/SA sub-sector.
A. Evidence of Selection in MH/SA
The Federal Employees Health Benefit Program (FEHBP) during the 1960’s and 1970’s
provided an early example of how concerns about selection drove competing insurers to lower
benefits for MH/SA services.  Plans offering more generous benefits quickly attracted individuals
who wanted to avail themselves of these services.  The generous coverage of MH/SA lost viability
as people not expecting to use services enrolled in plans with more limited coverage (Reed,
1974).  Use of mental health care has been found to be two to three times higher in the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield “high option” plan compared to the low option plan, even though the actual
coverage differences are quite small (Padgett et al., 1993), implying that the differences in use
were due to selection rather than demand response (moral hazard).  Further evidence for adverse
selection in the FEHBP comes from comparing responses to the price of MH/SA care under the
FEHBP and The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse et al., 1993).  In the RAND
experiment, individuals were randomly assigned to health insurance plans and the observed price
response to differential coverage was substantially lower than what was observed in FEHBP47
(Newhouse et al., 1993).  The differences in price response suggest that where plan choice was
possible (under FEHBP), the “high option” (lower priced) plan differentially attracted poorer risks
making it appear as if the plan with slightly more generous coverage induced much higher
utilization of MH/SA care.
Adverse selection is an issue for all of health insurance, but may be especially serious in
the mental health area.  Deb, Rubin and Wilcox-Gok (1996) found that individuals with a family
member with a mental illness were more likely than otherwise similar members of the U.S.
population to choose coverage with more generous mental health care provisions.  Sturm and his
colleagues (1994) analyzed the treatment of depression across health plans as part of the Medical
Outcomes Study (MOS), finding that depressed individuals receiving care from specialists were
more likely to migrate from prepaid to fee-for-service plans.  They also found that individuals
switching from prepaid to fee-for-service plans were at risk for poorer outcomes.  Ellis (1988)
examined the persistence of spending over time and its implications for health plan choice.
Individuals with a history of mental health care utilization had persistently higher levels of
spending than did otherwise similar insured individuals.  He also found that a history of mental
health care utilization had a significant impact on an individual’s choice of health plan.  Higher
levels of prior year mental health spending increases the likelihood that an enrollee chooses a low
deductible plan.  This suggests choice based on anticipated spending such that the expected
deductible payments exceed the differences in plan premium differentials.
Perneger and colleagues (1995) found evidence of adverse selection related to mental
health care in the context of insurance markets in Switzerland.  They analyzed a situation where
one indemnity plan among several health plans was changed to a managed care plan.  The
managed care plan introduced gatekeepers and limits on insurance coverage for psychiatric48
services.  Those who remained in the indemnity plan made on average 2.3 more visits for mental
health care in the previous year and were more likely to receive a prescription for a psychoactive
medication than those who chose managed care.
Taken together, these results suggest that users of mental health care may have greater
subsequent year health care spending than otherwise similar people, putting plans attracting
mental health users at a financial disadvantage.  Persistent levels of above-average spending for
the individuals with severe mental disorders within the Medicaid program was recently reported
by Kronick et al. (1996).  In sum, there is both direct and indirect evidence suggesting that the
mentally ill and substance abuse users are associated with higher levels of health care spending
and that they systematically select health plans that offer more generous coverage for behavioral
health treatment.  Such behavior creates economic incentives for health plans to adopt strategies
that will reduce their attractiveness to users of mental health care.
B.  Policy Responses to Selection: Fee-for-Service-Indemnity Contracts
During the 1970s and 1980s competition to avoid “bad risks” was channeled into limiting
coverage for treatment of mental and addictive disorders.  Approximately 22 states counteracted
adverse selection by mandated benefit statutes which specified minimum level of coverage for
MH/SA care (McGuire and Montgomery, 1982; Frank, 1989).  These statutes generally specified
coverage minimums in terms of coinsurance, limits on outpatient visits and hospital days, and
deductibles.  Since benefit design features were the key provisions of an insurance contract
determining coverage, regulation of these components of coverage was potentially effective in
limiting market failure associated with adverse selection.  The impact of mandated benefit statutes
was limited due to exemption of self-insured employers under ERISA.  It is worth noting that
most large self-insured employers (often with populations in several states) typically offered their49
employees health insurance plans that complied or exceeded the terms of most state mandated
benefit statutes.
This strategy towards “fixing” difficulties in the insurance market continues today.  In
1993 and 1994, debate took place regarding mandated benefits in insurance as proposed under
President Clinton’s Health Security Act.  The inclusion of MH/SA as part of the benefit mandate
was especially contentious, primarily because of concerns over the costs of such provisions.  The
same argument reappeared in 1996 in the form of proposed legislation that would call for parity in
benefit design provisions between health benefits and those for MH/SA care.  Again, concern over
the costs of such mandates and the uncertainty around predicted impacts strictly limited the scope
of the legislation that eventually passed (Appropriation Authorization for the Department of
Veterans Affairs, 1996).  Attenuating selection-related incentives is the main efficiency argument
supporting policies to mandate insurance benefits.
C. Selection and Managed Care: Distorting “Quality”
As competition among managed care plans becomes the predominant form of market
interaction in health care, adverse selection takes a new form which may actually be harder to
address in policy, relative to traditional forms of health insurance contracts discussed above.  That
is, as health insurance moves away from traditional fee-for-service-indemnity arrangements, where
enrollees have free choice of providers, and becomes managed care, the mechanisms a health
insurance plan uses to effectuate selection change from readily regulated coinsurance, deductibles,
limits and exclusions, to more difficult to regulate internal management processes which ration
treatment in managed care plans.50
Researchers on the economics and payment and managed care are well aware of the issue.
Ellis (in press) labels under provision of care to avoid bad risks as “skimping”.  Newhouse et al
(1997) call it “stinting”.  As Miller and Luft (1997) put it:
“Under the simple capitation payments that now exist, providers
and plans face strong disincentives to excel in care for the sickest
and most expensive patients.  Plans that develop a strong
reputation for excellence in quality of care for the sickest will
attract new high cost enrollees…”
The flip side, of course, is that in response to selection incentives the plan might provide
too many of the services used to treat the less seriously ill, in order to attract good risks.  A plan,
motivated by selection, might provide so many of certain services that enrollees may not benefit in
accord to what it costs the plan to provide them (Newhouse et al., 1997).  Hence, in the presence
of selection-related incentives, capitation and managed care market forces will generate too little
care in some area and too much in others.
This set of observations point to the likelihood that competition in the context of managed
care health plans will create strong incentives for rationing rules to be based not just on the
relative benefits provided by a service given an overall health care budget as was implied by the
second best equilibrium among health plans described in section III.B above.  Instead, the nature
of competition between health plans forces plans to take account of both the direct cost
containment impacts of rationing (e.g., setting a shadow price at a given level) as well as indirect
effects associated with the types of enrollees that are attracted to a plan under different patterns of
rationing across services.  The classic asymmetry of information between insurer and enrollees of
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) along with these market forces may create distortions in rationing
rules that result in service competition to attract profitable enrollees.51
We demonstrate this latter point by returning to the model of the planner’s problem of
setting shadow prices for managed care plans given in equations (1)-(4) above.  Consider now
profit maximization, and how this condition compares to the condition for efficiency.  Profit
maximization is used to describe the objectives of the plan.  Earlier, in (4), we described the
conditions for social efficiency in regard to managed care rationing.  If selection were not an
issue, a plan seeking to attract enrollees would have incentives to offer efficient insurance
(Zeckhauser, 1970).  Otherwise, another plan with the efficient combination of premium and
rationing would attract the business.  With the introduction of selection problems, however, the
close relation between the normative (efficient) and positive (profit-maximizing) plan will be
disturbed.
Here we characterize the nature of the distortion introduced.  We also introduce risk
adjustment at this point, since the purpose of risk adjustment is to contend with selection-related
incentives.
25  Define Rt to be the risk-adjusted payment a plan gets for enrolling a person of type
t.
26  Profits are then:
p = - ￿ ￿ ￿N R N m q t t t st s
t t
( ( ))
Recognize that the number of persons of type t joining a plan, Nt, is a positive function of the
benefits they anticipate, Nt(Bt).  Define C m q t st s
s
=￿ ( ) .  Ct is the cost of a person of type t.  The
first order condition for profit maximization with respect to qs is:
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Rewriting, we have
                                                       
25 See also the Chapter in this volume on risk adjustment.
26 This could be regarded as averaged over the characteristics of persons of type t.52
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Comparing conditions (6) and (4) reveals that the efficiency condition is embedded in the
profit maximizing condition, allowing us to characterize the distortion caused by selection.  The








( ) -  in the numerator of (6).  The two parts of the term due to the
selection distortion have to do with the responsiveness of membership to a change in the







, and to the profit and loss consequences of
membership of a person of type t, and to the level of spending on service s, mst.






 is the same for all t.  Then, the
term that will create distortions is the relation of risk adjustment to cost for persons of type t and
its correlation with spending for a service.  Consider first what happens without risk adjustment.
Then, Rt = R, and a common payment is made for all enrollees.  The term R – Ct will be smaller
for persons of a “high cost” type.  If the cross-product of this term with mst tends to be large, that
is, if people of this high cost type tend to put a high value on service s, then the numerator of (6)
                                                       
27 For presentational purposes, we disregard here the nature of persons’ and plans’ expectations about benefits and
costs.  We treat these as common knowledge.  Frank, Glazer, and McGuire (1998) analyze a similar model
where the benefit functions are expected benefits by the consumer.  Plans set q’s on the basis of their
expectations of the distribution of consumers’ expected benefits in the population.  Mental health care is
relatively predictable, making mental health possibly more vulnerable to selection incentives.53
will be large, and the shadow price for this service will be set “too high” (relative to the social
optimum) to discourage membership by this high cost type.  If the difference Rt – Ct is the same
for each type t, that is, if risk adjustment compensates for type differences in expected cost in a
way to equalize Rt – Ct, then risk adjustment will be effectively dealing with the incentive to
distort just described.  Equation (6) describes a situation where the profit-maximizing plan sets q
“too high” (rationing too tightly) for services that are valued by persons for whom risk adjustment
“underpays” and sets q “too low” for services valued by those for whom risk adjustment pays
generously.
28
All services are potential candidates for selection-driven distortions under managed care.
This is another way of saying that incentives to under- or over-provide mental health services
within a capitated plan must be considered in relation to the incentives to supply other services.
Mental health may be one of the services most distorted, but there will be others, and mental
health may not be the most in need of economic rescue.  Characterizing the incentives and
monitoring the actions of managed care plans is a central issue in the economics of health and
mental health.
D.  Policy Responses and Managed Care
Suppose it has been determined that some service, say mental health, needs special
protection in a health insurance market with managed care.  One implication of our analysis of
                                                                                                                                                                                  
28 Frank, Glazer and McGuire (1998) develop this line of argument and propose a distortion index stemming from
the selection-related incentives in the context of profit maximizing health plans paid by risk-adjusted capitation.
Based on an equation like (6), they show that services that are rationed tightly in managed care are those which
are predictable by the individual, and those with a positive correlation with other (predicted) spending.  The
Frank, Glazer, and McGuire (1998) index is illustrated using Medicaid data for AFDC-eligible adults from the
State of Michigan, they calculate the selection-related distortion index for eight major classes of services.
Mental health expenditures are relatively predictable, largely because of the high year-to-year correlation.  They
are not, however, different in their correlation with other costs, at least in this predominantly young, female54
managed care is that policies that focus primarily on the nominal insurance benefit will not be
sufficient to ameliorate the inefficiencies created by selection-related incentives.  Managed care
insurance contracts, with their complex rationing devices, are more remote from regulation than
traditional fee-for-service-indemnity contracts.  Many of the instruments that are used to ration
care under managed care are difficult for a regulator to observe and require clinical judgments
about individual cases.
An example is the application of the concept of “medical necessity”.  Most managed health
plans cover medically necessary services.  Medical necessity and therefore effective coverage
depends on a complex set of interactions involving features of the benefit package, the structure
of the provider network organized by the health plan, financial incentives facing providers and the
administrative mechanisms used to assign patients to specialty care and manage quality assurance.
Determination of medical necessity occurs on a case-by-case basis, thereby conferring discretion
on those making the decisions such as primary care physicians, plan clinical staff, specialists, and
case managers.  In a word, the management of care within a health plan has become increasingly
non-contractible.  The nominal insurance benefit has become one part of a complex contract
which rations care and provides protection against the financial risks of treating illness.
For many years, advocates for mental health and substance abuse have sought to achieve
“parity” in insurance benefits.  The analysis presented above suggests that such efforts, if they are
successful, will not be sufficient to guarantee equality in access to services in mental health (Frank
and McGuire, 1998).  If managed care rationing devices cannot be directly controlled, what
options are available to a regulator?
                                                                                                                                                                                  
population.  Applying the index does reveal that mental health is a service more subject to selection problems,
though the results are sensitive to the informational assumptions used.55
Risk adjustment of capitation payments and carve-out arrangements are two responses to
selection related incentives.  Purchasers of managed care services are making use of each
approach to deal with biased selection in the case of mental health and substance abuse.  For
example, the State of Maryland has chosen to integrate substance abuse services for Medicaid
enrollees with all other medical care.  Selection related incentives are being addressed by using
risk adjustment to adjust capitation rates for differences in enrollee health care risk.  In contrast,
the State of Arizona carves out (as in Figure 2) all mental health and substance abuse care from its
general Medicaid HMOs and contracts separately with one specialized managed behavioral health
care organization (MBHO) in each region of the state.  A third configuration is being proposed in
New York, where mental health is carved out of the Medicaid HMO program.  However, multiple
MBHOs would be permitted to compete to enroll individuals for their mental health care.  Each
competing MBHO is slated to be paid a flat capitation fee (Office of Mental Health, State of New
York, 1996).  How well can risk adjustment and carve-outs be expected to do in countering
selection incentives?
D.1. Risk Adjustment
Managed care plans can engage in various activities designed to select good (profitable)
risks from an insurance pool (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998).  They may prevent or discourage
high-cost individuals from joining their plan (sometimes called “dumping”) even if this is
prohibited under “open enrollment” regulations.  They may also distort the services they provide
in order to attract the good and deter the bad risks, a perfectly legal activity.  Risk adjustment is
intended to counter incentives to engage in activities which may lead to inefficient health plan
services and unequal access for potential enrollees.56
Risk adjustment of capitation rates makes use of information about the characteristics of
individuals to align payments with expected costs.  The rationale is that the closer payments track
costs, the less services will be the inefficiencies and ones just mentioned.  For example, age, sex,
welfare status, and county of residence have traditionally been used to adjust Medicare’s
capitation to HMOs enrolling program beneficiaries.  If those over the age of 75 years are found
to cost more, premium payments on the behalf of those older beneficiaries are adjusted upward by
an estimate of their higher average cost.  Most risk adjustment systems rely on demographic
factors and clinical information on individuals from past time periods.  The clinical information
usually consists of diagnoses and procedures arranged in clusters based on clinical judgments
regarding the complexity and intensity of past treatment (Ellis et al., 1996; Weiner et al., 1996).
The empirical research used to develop risk adjusters can be viewed in the context of an
empirical model of health care spending that relies on pooled time series and cross section data
(Newhouse, 1996; Newhouse et al., 1989).  Equation (7) is a simple characterization of such a
model
(7) Sit = a + Xit B + mi   + eit
Sit is spending for individual i in period t, Xit represents a set of characteristics of individuals that
are included in the risk adjustment system, m is a time invariant individual effect, eit is a possible
auto-regressive error with mean zero, and a and B are parameters.  Most evaluations of risk
adjustment rely on the ability of models such as that given in equation (7) to explain variation in
individual spending as measured by an R
2 statistic.  Newhouse and colleagues (1989) pointed out
that a more appropriate standard for judging the ability of a risk adjusted payment system to
attenuate selection related incentives is to measure the portion of the “explainable” variance
accounted for by the risk adjustment system.  Individuals (or plans) can only select a health plan57
(or deter enrollment) based on spending they can predict.  If one makes the assumption that
individuals know the information contained in a set of X’s and their past use, the explainable
variance consists of variation associated with the Xs, m, and say auto-correlation in e (Newhouse,
1996).
Risk adjustment can be thought of as a tax-subsidy scheme (Diamond, 1994), intended to
correct selection-created inefficiencies.  Selection problems can take two general forms:
individual-based discrimination and plan-wide actions such as service distortions.  If an empirical
risk adjustment system can set payments at predictable cost person-by-person, both of these
selection problems will be eliminated (Van der Ven and Ellis, Handbook).  Empirical risk
adjusters do not track predictable costs so closely, so the task for economics is to evaluate the
efficiency implications of feasible risk adjusters.  One way this has been done is by R-squared and
related statistical counters(??).  These methods quantify how close, in a statistical sense, a given
risk adjustment system falls in relation to a first-best system.  In a new literature on optimal risk
adjustment, weights on risk adjusters (such as age) are variables that are solved for within an
explicit market structure and an explicit welfare framework, and this welfare framework can be
used to evaluate alternative policies (Glazer and McGuire, 1998; Encinosa, 1998; Shen and Ellis,
1998).  This new work suggests that statistical and efficiency criteria do not give identical
rankings.  In general, the “optimal” risk adjusters from an efficiency standpoint are not regression
coefficients that maximize explainable variance in individual-level health care costs.
Classification Systems for Mental Health and Substance Abuse: In the development of
risk adjustment systems, little attention has been paid to MH/SA, partly because initial
development of the existing risk adjustment systems proceeded first in the Medicare context,
where MH/SA is a very small part of total spending.  Continued applied research on the systems,58
including use of younger populations, is leading to more attention to MH/SA. A consistent finding
in the research so far, however, is that however past diagnostic information is configured, it has
little predictive power in behavioral health (Ettner et al., 1998).
Classification of MH/SA patients has posed a difficult problem for policy makers since the
initial introduction of prospective payment policies in the early 1980s.  The development of
Medicare’s Prospective Payment System (PPS) required the federal government to determine
whether psychiatric and substance abuse Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) constituted an
adequate patient classification system.  Horgan and Jencks (1987) and Jencks and Goldman
(1987) reviewed competing patient classification systems for grouping psychiatric inpatients.
Their conclusion, expressing the notion of a low R square in lay language, was: “In general,
research has not provided a robust explanation of differences in costs between psychiatric
facilities.  In particular, research has not developed classification systems that class together
inpatient episodes with similar costs or that have substantial differences in costs between classes”
(Jencks and Goldman, 1987:S42).  The low explanatory power of the DRGs for MH/SA was not
the most serious problem.  The unexplained variation in cost was systematically related to certain
classes of facilities (conditional on the prior reimbursement system).  Even after risk adjustment,
simulation analyses (summarized in Jencks and Goldman) showed that more specialized
psychiatric facilities drew a more costly case mix than general hospitals without specialized
facilitates.  Thus the initial effect of putting MH/SA into the PPS would have conferred windfall
gains (on non-specialized facilities) and losses (on specialized facilities).  Responses of facilities to
the new system would have modified these loses and gains, but the fundamental unfairness of the
PPS in this case, which, we emphasize could only be evaluated with a conception of how the
equilibrium would look, could not be avoided (Freiman et al., 1987).59
The inadequacies of inpatient discharge level, risk adjustment raises concerns about the
potential of per-person level risk conventional adjustment to adjust capitation rates for mental
health care.  Other research in health services suggests that the variation in rates of use of MH/SA
care might be especially large and difficult to capture with the routinely available risk adjusters.
Research on demand for mental health services seldom offers models with explanatory power
comparable to those found in general health services.  In the RAND Health Insurance Experiment,
for example, Keeler et al (1986, 1988) were able to group general outpatient medical care into
“episodes” and explain the occurrence and extent of these episodes statistically.  A similar effort
met with much less success in the case of outpatient mental health care.
Two initial evaluations of risk adjusters for MH/SA have been completed using Medicaid
and private insurance data sets.  Ettner and Notman (1997) evaluated the predictive power of the
ACG classification system, a set of diagnostic clusters and age and sex groupings using data on
approximately 30,000 Medicaid enrollees in New Hampshire for fiscal years 1993 and 1994.  New
Hampshire-specific weights for the classification systems were constructed using fiscal year 1993
data to predict 1994 expenditures.  The authors evaluated the explanatory power of the
classification systems for predicting: 1) total individual health care spending, and 2) individual
MH/SA spending.  The results reveal several key points.  First, none of the classification systems
studied explained more than 4% of variance in total health spending, with the percent of variance
explained ranging from 2% to 4%.  Second, in the MH/SA area the maximum explanatory power
was 13% of the variance.  Third in the analysis of MH/SA spending the results suggest that
including age and sex along with a set of variables indicating whether an individual had 1,2 or 3+60
separate MH/SA disorders indicated in claims during the previous year provided greater
explanatory power than any other method.
29
In the second analysis Ettner et al. (1998) examined risk adjusters within a larger data set
of privately insured employees and their dependents for 1992 and 1993.  In that study, data from a
population of approximately 450,000 enrollees were examined to evaluate several conventional
risk adjustment systems.  To study the predictive ability of each system for total MH/SA
spending, the authors made use of actual health plan choices of employees to assess how well
each classification system would account for naturally occurring selection into plans (i.e. selection
with no risk adjustment in place).  The 1992 patterns of illness were used to classify enrollees and
to predict 1993 spending.  As in the case of New Hampshire, no classification system displayed
strong predictive ability.  The results from the analysis of naturally occurring selection across
plans for two large employer groups contained in the data illuminated the weaknesses of all the
classification systems.
30  When the payments that would have been made under each classification
scheme were compared with payments based on the simple average for all enrollee (across all plan
choices) little meaningful improvement was contributed by the risk adjusted payment mechanisms.
The results suggest that little of the systematic risk between plans was accounted for by the
classification methods examined. Thus, the condition implied by equation (6) to minimize
selection is unlikely to be met under any regression-based risk adjustment system.
                                                       
29 Dunn et al (1995) show that with stratified data and use of ADG, adjusted R
2 for total health charges can be as
high as 0.20.  This exceeds the explanatory power found in MH/SA.  The ADGs are aggregate of ACGs, which
include inpatient diagnoses.
30 The apparent selection across 3 plans may have been quite large.  For example, in comparing plans with similar
deductibles, differences in annual visit limits of 50, 50 and 25, and similar copayments for outpatient care, per
person per year costs ranged from $6 to $105.  Since the cost differences were unlikely to be attributable to
differences in limits we interpret cost variation to be largely due to selection.61
Risk adjustment policy can be combined with payment system changes.  By paying partly
on cost as in a mixed system, incentives to select are reduced (Newhouse, 1996).  In mental health
care, mixed payment systems are in use which resemble the one depicted in Figure 6.
D.2. Behavioral Health Carve-Outs
Behavioral health carve-outs have become central to payment and delivery of MH/SA
services under managed care.  Carve-outs are usually regarded as cost control devices.  Carving
out MH/SA from an indemnity plan or in an indemnity/managed care choice plan ensures that all
MH/SA care will be managed. (See Figure 1).  Carve-outs may also have a role in diminishing
selection-related incentives.  The economic role of carve-out programs can differ significantly
depending on the specific form of the carve-out.  For example, the carve-outs shown in Figure 3
are chosen by the health plan and can be viewed as an organizational structure that helps the
health plan implement its desired rationing scheme.  Viewed in this manner carve-outs which are
simple sub-contractors of health plans are not expected to have any impact on selection because
consumers continue to choose among integrated health plans where the implementation of
rationing rules across services can affect enrollment patterns.  The incentives to ration MH/SA
care to the organization are present with and without a carve-out contract.
In contrast, the type of carve-out program depicted in Figure 2 separates MH/SA services
from overall health care and as such removes it as a dimension of competition among health plans
for enrollees.  This can have potentially large impacts on the incentive to provide services.
Carving-out a service, MH/SA in this case, isolates MH/SA from selection-related incentives.
Rationing will be determined by the contract between the payer and the specialty MBHO.  It is
also important to note that the rationing for any one service depends on all the other service
demands.  Thus, carving-out any one service will affect the degree of rationing for all others.62
Carve-out programs have other pros and cons that must be considered along with the
potential welfare gains related to selection.  One controversial question relates to whether MH/SA
care is more effectively delivered in a fashion that is integrated with medical care via a primary
care physician.  In theory, “integrated” care is better than “fragmented” care.  In practice, a
separate mental health system has some advantages.  Primary care physicians tend to overlook
mental illness in their patients (Jencks, 1985; Morlock, 1989).  When mental illnesses are
recognized primary care physicians often fail to provide appropriate treatment (Shapiro et al.,
1987, Wells et al., 1996).
Carve-out programs add administrative costs.  Estimates of the additional administrative
costs associated with carve-out arrangements range from 8% to as much as 20% of MH/SA
benefit costs.  Finally, new boundaries between payers’ responsibility creates opportunities for
cost-shifting and strategic behavior.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that carve-out plans are
especially prone to adopt pharmacotherapeutic strategies because the drug benefit represents an
“off budget” set of treatments.  Brisson et al. (1998) finds a higher propensity for individuals with
histories of substance abuse treatment to be hospitalized in a general medical setting following
introduction of a carve-out plan.
V. The Public Mental Health and Substance Abuse Treatment System
A unique feature of mental health care delivery in most western nations is the large role
assigned to public hospitals and clinics for the care of individuals with mental and addictive
disorders.  Direct public services for the most seriously ill persons is a common feature of health
systems that may otherwise be organized to provide and pay for other health care with a range of
approaches (Hollingsworth, 1992).  The public mental health systems in the United States,63
Germany, Canada, Great Britain and France are quite similar, despite vast differences in their
general approaches to health care financing.  Each of these nations assigns responsibility for
mental health care to sub-national government (e.g. states in the U.S., länder in Germany,
provinces in Canada and local authorities in the United Kingdom) and tends to rely on local tax
funding more than either central government or premium-based funding.  The role of local
government-provided mental health care predates the development of either public or private
insurance arrangements and tends to emphasize providing care to the poor and disabled.  These
public mental health systems have been the source of public dissatisfaction with respect to the
quality of care and horizontal equity (Mangen and Rao, 1985; Mehnte, 1989).  Yet they continue
to play central roles in the care of severe mental and addictive illnesses.
There are three main factors that explain the commonality.  First, the technology of
treating severe mental disorders calls for different organizational and financial arrangements from
other medical conditions.  Second, public mental health systems predate modern insurance
arrangements, and these established systems of public provision may have inhibited other forms of
financing for mental health and substance abuse.  Third, the externalities created by mental
illnesses means that provision of mental health care has a public safety component and therefore
the state has a greater interest in assuming more direct control over the delivery of certain forms
of mental health care to fulfill its obligation of public protection.
A. The Technology of Treatment for the Severely Mentally Ill
 The acute health care delivery system is ill-equipped to deal with the array of problems
associated with severe mental disorders.  Mechanic (1989) describes the complexity of services
required for treatment of individuals with severe mental disorders this way:64
 “Effective community care for the most seriously disabled patients
requires performance of many of the same functions as the mental hospital,
ranging from assuring appropriate shelter to managing serious medical and
psychiatric problems.  To do so in the community context requires some influence
over areas of responsibility involving different sectors (housing, medical care,
social services, welfare) .… (p.  492)
 
 This characterization suggests important differences in the technology required for treating the
sickest and mostly costly people with mental illnesses from those with most medical conditions.
The observation that medical care delivery systems have difficulty accommodating individuals
with chronic diseases has been widely acknowledged in other contexts (Moon, 1996; Wallack and
Levine, 1996).  It appears that this point applies with special force in the case of severe mental
disorders.
 Treatment programs aimed at people with severe mental illnesses must concern themselves
with the acute care of the symptoms of illness, as does the rest of medicine.  In addition, however,
mental health care must address the housing, income support, rehabilitation, social contacts, and
social control of the affected individuals.  The nature of severe mental illnesses and their treatment
requires that mental health providers coordinate these services.  Many of the most successful
innovations in the treatment of severe mental disorders involve new ways of organizing and
coordinating the various elements of care for individuals with severe mental disorders (Stein and
Test, 1980; Dill and Rochefort, 1989; Schwartz, Goldman and Churgin, 1982, Taube, Morlock,
Burns and Santos, 1990).  The health systems in the U.S., Germany, Britain and Canada all
confine responsibility of the medical care system for mental health services and treatments to
those that roughly correspond to acute care medical treatments.  Such actions are consistent with
recognition of a different technology of treatment that may call for a different set of institutions.65
 In European contexts, the organizational response to differences in technology for treating
people with severe mental disorders in great measure reflects the political choices of planners or
the results of political bargaining between different levels of government.  In the U.S. context, the
organizational response to the needs of persons with serious mental illness represents a different
set of forces involving market failure, perhaps due to adverse selection and externalities
(discussed below), and the economics of a federalist system.
B. Fiscal Federalism and Public Mental Health Care
In assessing the lessons from the history of mental health policy, Grob (1994) points to the
evolving nature of fiscal federalism as a central force in shaping the role of government in mental
health care delivery.  He goes so far as to assert that for some payers, including states, cost
shifting has been as important in designing policies as the impetus to construct a “rational”
system.  “Deinstitutionalizing” the mentally ill refers to shrinking or closing state hospitals, and
transferring the care of previously hospitalized patients to a diverse set of care providers.  While a
rationale for deinstitutionalization can be made on the basis of single system cost-effectiveness,
cost-shifting was also a motive.  State government in the U.S. paid the costs in state hospitals,
and only a share of the costs of care given by alternative providers, courtesy of the federal
Medicaid program.
Since states (and other regional governments outside the U.S.) make the majority of
spending decisions about public funds for care of mental disorders, the literature has naturally
directed attention towards state choices regarding mental health policy.  A simple starting point
for analyses of state mental health policy is to view state policy decisions as being the result of
choices by a social planner seeking to coordinate mental health services for the poor.  State policy
makers have two major instruments: direct state spending on services, and the insurance-like66
Medicaid program.  Michael (1980) and Frank (1985) regard the “state” as a single decision-
maker with an objective function containing: welfare for the poor and state budget costs.  The
choices of the state planner are constrained by factors such as the income in the state, the size of
the public mental hospital system, the availability of alternatives to state funded providers (e.g.
nursing homes), federal rules governing Medicaid especially the federal matching rate on
spending,
31 and the amount of private insurance coverage in a state.  Direct state spending on
mental health care will be reduced, according to this approach, by generous federal matching
provisions,
32 the availability of care in settings funded by Medicaid (nursing homes), and
expansion of private insurance coverage for mental health care.  These all point to rational cost
shifting responses to exogenous changes in regulation and market structure.
Although few formal analyses of mental health financing for countries other than the U.S.
have appeared in the literature, similar observations have been made about the relation of central
government financing to local funds.  For example, Britain has experimented with central
government matching grants to local authorities (Knapp, 1990; Yellowlees, 1990).  In general,
these schemes have not resulted in the desired effort by localities.  In Germany, the sickness funds
have resisted expanding benefits to include long-term care for mental disorders due to concerns
that costs would be shifted from the lander to the sickness funds (Cooper and Bauer, 1987).
Existing empirical evidence from the U.S. is broadly consistent with the single decision-
maker model predictions.  For example, Frank (1985) using a cross section of states for the year
1976 found that the state share of the Medicaid program was positively related to per capita state
                                                       
31 The Medicaid program in the U.S. matches state spending according to a formula based on per capita income.
The federal government constrains minimum participation to 50% and maximum matching rates are about 78%.
This formula favors high-income states.
32 It is possible that the state’s elasticity of demand would be high enough to reverse this result, but this is very
unlikely.67
spending for direct mental health services.  The size of state mental hospital systems (relative to
population size) was estimated to have a large positive impact on spending, while the presence of
a mandated mental health care insurance statute (creating another destination for cost-shifting)
reduced state mental health spending.  Michael (1980) found that the availability of nursing home
services led to reduced use of state mental hospitals.  He also shows that the number of mental
hospitals per state senatorial district was estimated to have a positive and significant impact on the
use of public mental hospitals.  Gronfein (1985) found that the introduction of Medicaid, and its
opportunity for shifting mental health costs from state budgets was the most important factor
determining the rate of deinstitutionaliztion in states.  The Medicaid impact dominated the effects
of innovation in drug treatment and the creation of community mental health centers.  During the
period 1955 to 1965, the populations of public mental hospitals were reduced by about 1.5% a
year.  Following the implementation of Medicaid the rate of population reduction increased to 6%
a year.
The prominence of cost shifting in state mental health policy explains tensions between
federal (or central) governments and local governments in the United States and other western
nations in mental health policy.  For example, when the Medicaid and Medicare programs were
implemented in the United States, Congress included provisions which prohibited Medicaid
reimbursement for care provided in an “Institution for Mental Disease” (IMD) and limited
Medicare hospital payments to 190 days over an individual’s lifetime.  These rules were aimed at
preventing states from shifting the costs of state mental hospitals onto the federal government’s
budget (which turned out to be partially and temporarily successful).  Thus, once the federal
government appreciates the responses it will get in a cost shifting game with the states, the result68
will be a division of labor that may leave states with their historical responsibility for public mental
hospitals that care for the most impaired and difficult indigent people with mental disorders.
Cost shifting has also been reported in Canada.  Following adoption of the National Health
Insurance plan in 1968, Nova Scotia and other provinces attempted to reorganize mental health
services in order to capture health insurance payments for services which were previously the
responsibility of the provincial government (Rochefort, 1993).  The National Health Insurance
plan guarded against cost shifting by (1) strictly limiting the range of providers who could be
reimbursed for supplying mental health care (MDs only), and (2) limiting the scope of services to
acute care treatment, thereby excluding day treatment and rehabilitation services.
While single decision-maker models are adequate to explain cost shifting behavior
between federal and state (regional) government, this approach may not offer a fully satisfactory
explanation for observed patterns of mental health policy.  Within a state, agencies (Medicaid,
mental health, substance abuse) may behave as independent (and possibly competing)
organizations.  Casual observations have noted policies which shift responsibility for care of
individuals with mental disorders from state mental health agencies to social welfare agencies,
school systems and criminal justice programs.  Such observations suggest the limits of
characterizing state government behavior in terms of a single planner that coordinates policy
(Rochefort, 1993; Mangen and Rao, 1985; Cooper and Bauer, 1987).  One way to investigate the
empirical importance of a state’s organizational choices is to see if different state’s approaches to
dividing up administrative responsibility for Medicaid, mental health, substance abuse, and related
services affect the level of state spending on those services.  Using a time-series of the fifty states
in the United States, Jacobsen, Notman, and McGuire (1996) found that organizational changes,
such as putting responsibility for substance-abuse services in a mental health department had,69
predictable, but small, effects on levels of spending.  If intrastate division of labor among agencies
matters for state fiscal outcomes, the single decision-maker model is contradicted.
A natural way to regard intergovernmental relations is as a sequential game consisting of
the federal government, state government, local government and participants in private markets
(Frank and McGuire, 1996).  The federal government makes policy given the historical role of the
states which in turn sets the stage for state policy action.  The state and federal policies determine
the outlines of the market where private parties buy and sell insurance against the consequences of
mental and addictive illnesses.
Within this framework, the federal government sets rules for public insurance programs
(Medicaid) that seek to limit the shifting of the costs of state mental hospitals from state to federal
budgets.  Marmor and Gill (1989) propose a political model along these lines that applies to the
U.S. and Britain.  The IMD rule associated with the U.S. Medicaid program, noted above, is one
example of a policy adopted to reduce cost shifting by states.  States in turn responded to
matching provisions under Medicaid by orienting program design towards Medicaid.  For
example, state governments shifted large numbers of elderly residents in state mental hospitals to
nursing homes following the introduction of Medicaid in the late 1960s.  This meant that the costs
of treating one segment of the elderly population were moved entirely off budget for the state
mental health agency.  State governments retained some financial responsibility via matching
provisions, of roughly 30% to 50%, assigned to the state under the Medicaid program.
States also set general rules within which individual agencies and local governments
operate.  Within state governments, funding for mental health care and substance abuse treatment
is administered and often supplied separately.  Nevertheless, there is considerable co-occurrence
of these classes of disorders.  Current clinical thought suggests that organizational and payment70
arrangements stand in the way of effective treatment for this class of expensive and disabling
conditions.  Policy regarding utilization of state mental hospitals offers an example of the response
by local mental health systems to of state payment rules.  For many years state mental health
agencies provided public mental hospital services to local public mental health programs “free of
charge” (Frank and Gaynor, 1995).  One result was a tendency of local programs to “overuse”
state mental hospitals.  This set of institutional arrangements has been pointed to as leading to
distortions in spending towards state mental hospitals and to inefficiently low levels of effort
aimed at treating people with severe mental illness in community programs (McGuire and
Riordan, 1995).
Private insurance markets offer insurance designs in the context of a public mental health
system that will provide hospital and outpatient care for mentally ill individuals without insurance
coverage.  Approximately 55% of individuals admitted to public psychiatric hospitals in 1994 had
no insurance coverage.  In addition, a significant number of people in state hospitals with
coverage had exhausted their mental health benefit.  The presence of a public mental health
system along with market forces associated with selection incentives discussed above serve to
undermine the provision of private insurance for mental health and substance abuse care.  The
availability of publicly funded and provided mental health care allows employers to strictly limit
insurance coverage for mental health care while at the same time giving their employees recourse
should a catastrophic mental illness strike.  As noted earlier, mandated mental health insurance
statutes represent a policy response by states to market failures stemming from adverse selection.
Mandates also represent a means of shifting costs from state government budgets to private
employers (Frisman, McGuire and Rosenbach, 1985).  Mental health mandates have been
politically contentious in state legislature and have been limited in their effect by federal policy.71
The federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) allows self-insured firms to be
exempt from state laws which govern the business of insurance.  During the 1980s and 1990s an
increasing number of mid and large size firms have chosen to become self-insured.  The
consequences are that in most states only a modest portion of the population is subject to
mandated benefit statutes.  Thus, federal policy has limited the ability of states to 1) address
market failure in insurance and 2) shift costs onto private employers.
Mental health policy can be viewed as a cascading cost shifting game.  Each of the players
across levels and within levels of the game makes choices subject to rules set at a higher level.
Players are presumed to be aware of the behavior of other players at the same level and below and
develop policies accordingly.  These ideas appear also to apply in nations with federal types of
systems in mental health, including Britain, Germany, and Canada (Yellowlees, 1990; Marmor and
Gill, 1989).
B.  Externalities and Public Mental Health Care
Prior to the 1820s, mental problems were not so clearly part of the medical domain.  Care
for “lunatics” or “distracted “ persons was provided through a variety of informal mechanisms
(Grob, 1994).  Poor houses and almshouses were settings for the support of people with disabling
mental problems.  During the first part of the 19
th century a new institution, the asylum, became
the focal point for treatment of more clearly recognized mental illnesses.  Initially these
institutions were the shared responsibility of state and local governments.  State government in
the 1820s and 1830s typically provided capital financing for asylums and localities paid for
operating expenses.  Initially, the priority populations for treatment in asylums were individuals
viewed as “dangerously insane” (Grob, 1973).  The requirement that local government pay for
costs of treating mentally ill people in asylums created an incentive for localities to continue72
housing the mentally ill in almshouses which had very low per diem costs.  Aware of the problems
created by divided responsibility for asylums, states began to take over all financial and
operational responsibility for asylums.  As financial responsibility shifted to state governments,
localities developed new enthusiasm for the use of asylums to treat the mentally ill.  Not only did
localities transfer responsibility to state asylums for individuals that were “chronically” mentally
ill, they also redefined senility as a psychiatric condition and shifted responsibility and the costs of
caring for the senile elderly to the state.  The state has had the paramount role in mental health
policy ever since.
Thus from early in the 19
th century to the present the state mental hospital system (and
later state mental health systems) has played two roles.  First, it has served as an institution for
involuntary treatment and confinement of individuals who were viewed as dangerous due to a
mental disorders.  Second, it has served as a safety net institution for housing and care of other
disabled and vulnerable populations (initially the senile elderly, later chronic brain damaged
alcoholics).  Two roles of the state have been used to justify the presence and persistence of a
public mental health system that supplies involuntary treatment (Rubin, 1978).  These are the
parens patriae doctrine and the police power of the state.  The parens patriae doctrine claims
that when an individual is mentally incapable of taking care of him or herself, the state may serve
as an agent of the individual and institutionalize the individual in order to care adequately for
them.  The police power of the state justifies institutionalization of individuals who are a danger
to themselves or others in order to protect the individual or society at large.  In the latter case the
state can choose between separating an individual from society and offering treatment via the
mental health system or through incarceration in the criminal justice system.73
The presence of external effects provides an efficiency underpinning to both justifications
for assigning the state a role in involuntary commitment for mental health care.  The parens
patriae doctrine substitutes judgments of the state for individual choice based on the notion that
there is a collective interest in seeing that individuals who are so impaired by mental disorders
receive sufficient care so as to survive and possibly improve their ability to function or recover.
This collective interest is a consumption externality, the polity benefiting from consumption of
mental health care by those too impaired to make such choices on their own.  The police power
rationale also involves an externality.  Protecting affected individuals intent on harming
themselves or protecting the general public from individuals whose mental disorders make them
dangerous to others through treatment and confinement also confers external benefits.  Publicly
funded mental hospitals that care for these individuals generate some non-excludable benefits and
therefore have a public good feature.
All U.S. states have laws and regulations that govern the process by which individuals can
be involuntarily committed to mental institutions.  Since the early 1970s there has also been
judicially imposed regulation concerning the conditions of the institutions to which these
individuals are committed.  Over the past 30 years there has been considerable flux in public
policy regarding involuntarily commitment to mental hospitals (Rubin, 1978).  Since the early
1970s state psychiatric hospitals have been required to provide active treatment and to have
physical facilities and staffs that are consistent with what the courts have viewed as the ability to
provide active treatment.
Empirical analyses have shown that commitment laws and regulations, as well as court-
dictated facility and staffing guidelines, have had a significant impact on the size of the
populations served in public mental hospitals as well as the budgets of those institutions.74
Lambrinos and Rubin (1981) used a simultaneous equations model to estimate the impact of
commitment laws and regulations on average daily census and spending on public mental hospitals
with data from 1974 and 1975.  Their results showed that states that institute mechanisms to
protect patient rights such as appointment of an attorney and requiring a formal hearing tend to
reduce use of mental institutions.  States that clearly define “risk” and disability in their
commitment statutes also tend to have lower rates of institutionalization.  Rubin (1980) and
Lambrinos and Rubin (1981) offer evidence suggesting that the regulations setting out standards
for staffing and the physical plants of state hospitals have increased spending on public mental
health care.
The state responsibility for public protection and the care of those who cannot fend for
themselves is a long-established basis for the public mental hospital, a role predating the
development of either public or private insurance mechanisms.  Most states continue to have laws
in place that tend to favor society’s interests (externalities) over individual liberties of the mentally
ill.  This in part explains the persistence of the state role in provision of mental health care.
Litigation and court decisions during the 1970s have forced states to provide treatment in public
mental institutions which, in turn, increased spending on those institutions in the 1970s and
1980s.
33  At the same time the division of labor has shifted whereby private organizations have
increasingly served individuals with insurance (public and private) who are involuntarily
committed.  State mental hospitals have become facilities that serve the most impaired, dangerous,
and indigent people with mental illness.  Privatization of production in this area of service has
been quite limited.
                                                       
33 For an overview of the troubling history of the state mental hospital in the United States see Grob (1973, 1994).75
VI. Conclusions
Economic analyses of the cost of illness and other assessments of the global burden of
disease testify to the disabling effect of mental disorders.  Mental illnesses often persist, and can
be accompanied by a range of social pathologies, generating public misunderstanding and fear.
Public safety is therefore viewed as a key product of the mental health care system, one factor in
explaining the major role assigned to government in the financing and delivery of mental health
services relative to what is found in general medical care.  There is an unresolved tension between
the insurance-medical care delivery aspects of mental health care and the public safety role.  For
most of this century the public safety role featuring direct government provision appears to have
dominated the organization and financing of this system.  Nevertheless, over the past thirty years,
private institutions and markets have ascended to important positions in the provision of mental
health services.  Markets for health insurance and health services have developed against a
background of large publicly funded and managed mental health system, though downsizing has
been one key force affecting the development of private insurance markets in the U.S. and the
design and implementation of public insurance in the U.S., Britain and Canada among other
nations.
Concerns about insurance arrangements in mental health relative to general medical care
have dominated policy debates in the mental health arena during the 1980s and 1990s.  Here the
traditional factors which threaten the efficient functioning of insurance markets, adverse selection
and moral hazard, are important for understanding the performance of the market with regard to
mental health care.  Mental health advocates are troubled by the “special treatment” of the
mentally ill in the structure of private insurance.  Advocates have tended to understand the special
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treatment as discrimination rather than as a response to economic fundamentals.  Payers have
been deeply troubled by the cost control problems associated with coverage of mental health care
under indemnity-fee for service arrangements.
In economic terms, the behavior of providers and consumers in the market for mental
health services reflects the characteristics of mental health disorders and their treatments.
Adverse selection and moral hazard appear to hit mental health markets with special force.  In
some of the first economic research on mental health, the demand response was found to be high.
The persistence of many mental disorders and the fact that people most likely to suffer from
mental disorders are most likely to choose health plans with generous mental coverage suggests
strong incentives for plans to limit mental health coverage.  Sorting out the roles of moral hazard
and selection in explaining observed market outcomes, and in terms of the implications for
optimal policy, has been an ongoing theme in research in the economics of mental health.
The basis for the institutions governing coverage for mental health care have been
dramatically altered by managed care, which changes the terms of Zeckhauser’s dilemma, wherein
coverage should balance losses from risk and moral hazard.  Mental health services are now
rationed by means other than demand-side prices.  Even though little is known about internal
rationing methods used within managed care organizations, the ability to control costs in this way
means that the main efficiency argument against parity in mental health coverage is potentially
weakened under managed care.  At the same time, parity in demand-side cost sharing delivers less
because expanded nominal coverage is no longer a guarantee of access.  Demand-side cost
sharing may no longer be the binding constraint on use.
Managed care has also continued to treat mental health differently than other illnesses, the
most important example being the emergence of behavioral health carve-out programs.  Are these77
institutions a fiscal discrimination against the mentally ill, or a response to market failure?
Economic research understands these institutions in terms of key functions that they serve.  The
first relates to economies of specialization and control of moral hazard, while a second involves
attenuation of selection related incentives common in competitive insurance markets.  Payer
carve-outs may increase market efficiency by removing mental health from competition for “good
risks” among health plans.
As the focus of government policy towards mental health has shifted towards treatment
and away from public safety, maintenance of large publicly supported institutions has been harder
to justify.  The public mental hospital is increasingly being consigned to care for involuntarily
committed individuals and the severely impaired, narrowing its public safety function.  The
emergence of private providers of managed behavioral health care that will assume some risk, has
proved to be an attractive alternative to a number of states.  The result is a shifting of functions
for many state governments from payer (via grants) and provider to payer (via contracts) and
regulator.  A key dilemma facing the states is that while insurance markets continue to be subject
to failures stemming from selection related incentives, state Medicaid programs and the related
federal disability programs are becoming increasingly restricted.  States remain nevertheless
responsible for the indigent mentally ill, yet they are reducing the infrastructure available to attend
to the mental health needs of these vulnerable populations.  How states will choose to address
their traditional role as provider of last resort in the context of the new private market for mental
health care is unclear.  What is clear is that in the past fifty years resource allocation in mental
health in dealing with state government has moved steadily out of the realm of public
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FIGURE 5


























MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SPENDING BY SOURCE OF PAYMENT, U.S., 1996
Payer MH/SA %* All Health %*
Private Insurance 25.8 31.0
Private Out-of-Pocket 15.1 18.1
Medicare 14.0 21.0
Medicaid 18.8 14.8
Other Federal 3.9 4.3
Other State/Local 19.4 7.2
Other Private 2.7 3.3
Total 100 100
* Percentages may not sum due to rounding.
Source: McKusick et al., 199885
TABLE 2
SPENDING ON SPECIALTY CARE ORGANIZATIONS, U.S.
(NOMINAL DOLLARS)
1969 1994
State Mental Hospitals $1,814 million $7,824 million
General Hospital Psychiatric Units 298 5,344
Private Psychiatric Hospitals 450 6,468
VA Medical Centers 122 1,386
Residential Treatment Centers 186 2,360
Free Standing Clinics 202 6,046
Community Based Treatment Programs 220 3,706
Total $3,293 million $33,136 million
Source: Mental Health, United States, 1998.86
TABLE 3
RESEARCH ON DEMAND RESPONSE
Study Type of Elasticity MH/SA Estimate General Health Estimate
McGuire (1981) Point -1.00
Taube et al. (1986) Point (level of use) -0.54 -0.13
Horgan (1986) Point (level of use) -0.44 -0.16
Ellis and McGuire (1986) Point (level of use) -0.37
Manning et al. (1988) Arc -0.80 -0.30
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